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2I.  INTRODUCTION
Comparative institutional analysis (CIA) begins with the simple observation that our 
primary decision-making processes -- institutions, such as the market, the courts, and the 
political process -- are each subject to certain structural constraints that necessarily effect an 
institution’s ability to provide the desired relief or to further an agreed upon social goal.1 Each 
institution is limited by its design.2  Beyond the pages of law review articles, there are no 
frictionless institutional choices, only “imperfect alternatives” 3 that all groan and deteriorate
1
   As discussed in this Essay, CIA refers to the method of public policy analysis outlined 
principally by Neil Komesar.  NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 9 (2001) (asserting “law and rights are the product of tough 
institutional choices impacted by systemic variables such as the costs of participation and 
numbers and complexity”).  Komesar’s use of the term “institution” differs from that of 
institutional economists, such as Douglas North, who use the term to signify “laws, rules, and 
customs.”  Id. at 31.  See also Daniel H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law's 
Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 261, 263-64 (2004) (describing divergence between Komesar’s 
terminology and that used by institutional economists).  Komesar defines institutions as “large-
scale social decision-making processes – markets, communities, political processes, and the 
courts.”  KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra, at 31.  For a discussion of CIA’s debt to Ronald Coase 
see Cole, supra, at 262 (noting Coase had “championed” comparative institutional analysis). 
2
 Institutional behavior is a function of design and participation.  See Id. at 29-31 
(discussing Komesar’s “participation-based” approach).  Participation is, in turn, a function of 
the average per capita stakes, information costs, and the costs associated with collective action.  
Id.  Important design features include the extent to which an institution is insulated from bottom-
up atomistic forces or is designed primary for top-down or bottom-up decision making.  See Neil 
K. Komesar, Basic Instincts: Participation, Economics and Institutional Choice, Comparative 
Institutional Analysis Conference, September 10-11, 2004, at 5, available at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/CIA-Conference-Papers.htm  (last visited August 22, 2005) (stating 
“degree to which an institution is characterized by bottom-up versus top-down decision-making 
can be an important design feature[]”).
3
 Komesar uses the term “imperfect alternatives” to describe the inevitable result of 
comparative institutional analysis.  NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 271 (1994).  No single institutional 
choice will produce an optimal result.  Id.
3under the weight of increasing numbers and increasing complexity.4
This dose of structural realism exposes a basic flaw that pervades contemporary legal 
analysis across the ideological spectrum: the conceit of single institutionalism.5 Because all 
institutions are irretrievably flawed and limited, every inquiry regarding the competency of a 
particular target institution will find the target experiencing some form of failure.6  The 
identification of failure invites the analyst to propose the substitution of an idealized rescue 
institution.7  Without a rigorous comparative analysis of the institutions’ relative strengths and 
weaknesses, the rejection of the target is a foregone conclusion and the identity of the rescue 
institution is most likely determined by ideology or intuition, reflecting our strong tendency to 
conflate certain social goals with particular institutions.8
By examining the movement for the equal recognition of same-sex relationships, this 
Essay builds on these basic observations and introduces a new dimension to CIA, namely the 
4
  Central to Komesar’s articulation of CIA is the observation that “institutions tend to 
move together.”  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 23.  In particular, Komesar identifies a clear “link 
between institutional performance and variation in numbers and complexity.”  Id.  
5 Id. at 20-1.  Given that all institutions feel the weight of increasing numbers and 
complexity, it is not sufficient to identify the shortcomings of a particular institution because all 
institutions have shortcomings.  Id. at 23 (stating “[a]ll institutions are imperfect and choices 
between alternatives can be sensibly made only by considering their relative merits”)  Single 
institutionalism refers to an instance where an analyst details the deficiencies of an institution, 
but fails to interrogate the alternative institutional settings with the same vigor.  See e.g., Id. at 21 
(discussing recommendation for “a greater role for the judiciary” without “consideration of 
variation in the ability of the judiciary”).     
6
   As Komesar notes, “market failure is a trivial necessary condition with little analytic 
value.  It is always fulfilled and, in the complex world in which we live, always significantly 
fulfilled.”  Komesar, supra note 2, at 2.  
7
  Komesar observes that “the implicit assumption” of single institutionalism “is that a 
perfect or idealized institution is waiting in the wings.”  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 24.
8
   Komesar explains the frequency with which certain goals are associated with certain 
institutions by reference to a tendency on the part of commentators to “hardwire” institutions to 
4dynamic process through which social goals are articulated and social change is realized.   
Despite its expressed concern with the “real world,”9 CIA’s failure to interrogate the nature of 
social goals creates a frictionless blind spot in its analytic frame where social goals are expressed 
as vague exogenous conceptions of the good, such as equality, strong property rights, or resource 
allocation efficiency.10  The relatively specific and highly polarizing goal of equal recognition of 
same-sex relationships is more emblematic of the type of contested social goals that command 
center stage in today’s “culture wars.”11  The acknowledgment that the production of social goals
involves institutional behavior, as well as multiple sites of contestation, will enhance the analytic 
power of CIA and offer a comparative institutional approach to social movement theory.12  Other 
similarly divisive struggles over the proper iteration of the good, such as abortion rights or gun 
control, could produce an equally productive discussion of CIA and its application to social 
goals.  Id. at 174.
9 See id. at 22 (discussing “real-world institutions”).
10 See William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Dynamics: a Comparative Institutional Analysis 
Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 514 (2000) (noting that “comparative institutionalism 
cannot neglect the importance of scrutiny of goal choice”).  See also, Howard S. Erlanger & 
Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 988 
(1997) (discussing influence of goal choice on CIA).
11
 The traditional values movement began using the term “culture war” as a “catch-
phrase” for the debate over homosexuality in 1992.  DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: 
ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 55 (1997) (defining “culture wars” as “struggles 
over ideas and values, rights and responsibilities”). See infra note 16 (defining “traditional 
values movement”).  The term is now issued to describe a number of polarizing public policy 
disputes regarding family and individual rights.  See generally, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, Culture Wars, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_war (last visited Aug. 24, 
2005).
12
   For a description of the evolution of social movement theory and scholarship see 
Edward L. Rubin, Symposium: Social Movements and Law Reform: Passing Through The Door: 
Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. (2001) (describing 
development of social movement theory and social movement scholarship).  
5movements.13
The debate over same-sex relationships offers a rich context for an examination of the 
atomistic forces that shape participation in alternative decision-making processes and thereby 
determine institutional behavior.  Indeed, when viewed through the lens of CIA, the debate 
appears to be a long exercise in strategic institutional analysis where advocates on either side 
evaluate institutions in terms of competency to supply the desired rights or status, responsiveness 
to demands for such rights or status, and resilience against attempts by opponents to subvert the 
process or to reverse gains. This “strategic” analysis does not identify the optimal institution, but 
rather informs the allocation of resources among institutions as advocates simultaneously pursue 
their goal in a variety of complementary institutional settings.14 Not surprisingly, grass roots 
advocates do not suffer from the academic shortcoming of single institutionalism nor do they 
“hardwire” goals to certain institutions.15  Arguably, some of the greatest gains in the recognition 
of same-sex relationships have come from the market, which many might assume to be an 
unlikely place for progressive social change.
In a world with contested social goals, institutions can not only secure desired rights or 
status, they can also blunt or reverse gains secured by the opposing side in other institutional 
settings. This has led to a creative and combative program of institutional one-upmanship where 
gains secured by pro-gay advocates through the market or courts are frequently reversed by the 
13 See e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Symposium: Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A 
Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2000) (arguing “tort system is 
an imperfect policymaking institution, but it can enhance the policymaking process”).
14
 As such, this analysis does not identify the singular “least imperfect alternative.”  
KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 271. 
15
 KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 174-75 (noting “you cannot hardwire goals and institutions 
6proponents of “traditional values” through the political process.16 Moreover, it is important to 
remember that battles over contested social goals take place within a democratic frame where a 
motivated majority can choose to rewrite the rules that define institutions and their decision-
making authority.  This observation has not been lost on the advocates of traditional values who 
have increasingly looked to the constitutional amendment process, on both the state and federal 
levels, as a means to exercise the ultimate majoritarian prerogative.17 The ability of the majority
to rewrite the rules has obvious implications for social movements designed to secure minority 
rights, but it also underscores the ultimately contingent nature of CIA.
In short, this Essay challenges CIA to contextualize its application to contested social 
goals and suggests that CIA could enrich social movement theory.  It also confirms the suspicion 
of Neil Komesar, the chief architect of CIA, that atomistic forces, in this case individuals with 
strongly held values working for social change, understand comparative analysis and practice it 
instinctively.18 Part II of the Essay examines CIA’s failure to consider the production of social 
and, therefore, no program of law and public policy follows from goal choice[]”).  
16
  For purposes of this Essay, I refer to the social movement opposing the recognition of 
same-sex couples as the traditional values movement.  Eskridge refers to this as the “traditional 
family values” (TFV) “countermovement.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr, Symposium Centennial 
Celebration: Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2079 (2002).  The traditional values movement is 
often characterized as a backlash against the recent successes of the Lesbian Gay Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) movement.   Didi Herman, who has conducted a comprehensive study of 
the anti-gay policies and activities of pro-family organizations, rejects that these activities 
represent a Abacklash.@ DIDI HERMAN, supra note 11, at 195 .  Instead, Herman describes the 
traditional values movement as a Aparadigmatic movement for social change.@ Id
17 See Jeffrey Rosen, How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at 48 
(noting that federal marriage amendment has potential to “provoke a mini-culture war in each of 
the 50 state legislatures”).
18
  Komesar writes:  “[e]ven if scholars and public officials will not do comparative 
institutional analysis, atomistic actors will.”  Komesar, supra 2, at 21.  
7goals, the single institutionalism practiced by social movement theory, and the nature of strategic 
institutional choice.  Part III describes the forces aligned on either side of the struggle over the 
recognition of same-sex relationships and outlines the costs and benefits associated with 
participation.  Part IV evaluates the pro-recognition gains made in various institutional settings in 
terms of the three core components of strategic institutional choice:  competency, responsiveness, 
and resilience.  Part V offers some final thoughts on the constitutional amendment process and 
the potential transitory nature of minority gains.
II. CONTESTED SOCIAL GOALS AND THE NATURE OF CHOICE
CIA urges existing approaches to law and public policy to engage in a comparative 
analysis and to reject the ingrained notion that certain social goals are “hardwired” to certain 
institutions (e.g., resource allocation efficiency and the market).19 Indeed, a growing number of 
legal analysts have eschewed the tidiness of single institutionalism in favor of the imprecise and 
messy enterprise of comparative analysis.20 This has produced a rich and nuanced literature that 
explores institutional behavior as a function of design and participation.21  However, this
19
  Komesar decries this tendency to “hardwire” certain goals to certain institutions as it 
forms the starting point for single institutionalism.   See KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 174 (pointing 
to “Richard Epstein’s aversion to the rent-seeking, welfare state and Margaret’s Radin’s aversion 
to the callous, atomistic market”).
20
 CIA has been applied in a wide variety of disciplines, including: criminal law, 
cyberlaw, environmental law, federalism, international law, land use planning, regulation of the 
legal profession, product liability law, and tort litigation.  See id. at 177 (discussing areas where 
CIA applied).
21 See e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who 
Should Control Lawyer Regulation – Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167 
(2003) (lawyer regulation); Buzbee, supra note 10 (land use planning); Daniel H. Cole, The 
Importance of Being Comparative, 33 IND. L. REV. 921 (2000)(environmental law);  Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE  J. INT’L L.
1(1999)(international law);  Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the 
8literature is necessarily unidirectional, focusing on the best implementation of a received social 
goal, because the analysis takes place under the artificial constraint of consensus.22 As a result, 
CIA is employed halfway through a social conversation regarding any social goal.  By ignoring 
the dynamic role of institutions in the negotiation and production of social goals, CIA remains a 
one-dimensional model that accepts a prescriptive pronouncement of the good and identifies the 
best institutional setting for the implementation of that good.
The recognition that social goals are contested also has obvious applicability to social 
movement theory.  As articulated by legal scholars, social movement theory is preoccupied with 
the courts.23  Some commentators take political scientists to task for neglecting the role of the 
courts in social change,24 whereas others debate whether courts can function as a situs of 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (corporate law); Susan 
Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: the Case of Intermediary Liability 
for Defamation, 14 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 569 (2001)(cyberlaw); Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic 
Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Perfect 
Institutional Choice, 7 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998)(family law); Lytton, supra
note 13 (land use planning).
22
  Benjamin H. Barton notes that “[a] further controversy in institutional analysis is the 
choice of values that underlie the analysis and the criteria for comparison.”  Barton, supra note 
21, at 1177.  In particular, William W. Buzbee has specifically challenged CIA with regard to the 
importance of goal choice. Buzbee, supra note 10, at 514.  Buzbee argues: “The basic point that 
goal choice cannot be examined to the exclusion of considerations of institutional choice is 
undoubtedly sound, but an intertwined analysis of policy goals is both necessary and is itself a 
contested part of the public policy game recognizes the need to consider goal choice.”  Id.
23 Of course, many would say that legal scholars, as a class, were preoccupied with the 
courts. Attempting to explain the relationship between legal scholars and judges, Komesar 
writes: “Here are people to converse with– people like us . . . reflective judges are the ultimate 
pen pals.”  Komesar, supra note 2, at 23.
24
 William Eskridge advocates the integration of social movement theory into legal 
education in light of the influence of social movements on the evolution of the law.  William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Symposium: Social Movements And Law Reform: Channeling: Identity-Based 
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).   He also notes that legal 
scholars have a valuable perspective to bring to social movement theory, stating: “The social 
9meaningful social change.25 In any event, courts remain central to the core inquiry of social 
movement theory, thereby giving rise to its own particular brand of single institutionalism. An 
application of CIA to social movement theory would shift the focus to alternative institutional 
settings.  Moreover, the rejection of the myth of a common policy goal allows for the 
development within CIA of a strategic multi-force approach that is more closely reflected by the 
lived experience of individuals who work for social change.26  Advocates for social change 
practice a form of strategic institutional choice where institutions are evaluated in terms of their 
competency, responsiveness, and resilience.  The activity of “institutional choice” informs the 
rational allocation of resources between multiple complementary institutional alternatives.  It 
does not seek to identify the “best” or “least imperfect” alternative to the exclusion of all 
others.27
A.  Inside the Black Box of Social Goals
In a time of persistent culture wars, it is difficult to identify a social goal that is not 
movements literature does not adequately reflect the importance of the law.”  Id. at 420.  Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, however, tempers this view with the observation that legal “scholars overstate 
law’s capacity to trigger social movements and undervalue nonlegal, noninstitutional forms of 
political activism.”  Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: the Case of 
Affirmative Action, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1489 (2005).
25
  Gerald Rosenberg set off a continuing debate over the role of the courts in social 
change with the 1991 publication of his book: THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE?.  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE?  (1991).   Rosenberg concludes, “U.S. courts can almost never be effective 
producers of significant social reform.  At best, they can second the social reform acts of the 
other branches of government.”  Id. at 338.  For a collection of essays concerning the role of the 
courts in social change see LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL 
CHANGE (David A. Schultz, ed. 1999).
26
  See infra text accompanying notes 91-102 (discussing multi-force approach). 
27
  KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 271 (discussing nature of “imperfect alternatives). 
10
potentially polarizing.28  The 2004 Presidential election left images of a country ideologically 
divided between Red states and Blue states.29 Indeed, many university faculties are divided along 
ideological lines which are just as sharp, but lack the seeming clarity of partisan color coding.30
Only the most abstract iterations of the good are capable of commanding anything that 
approaches consensus, and consensus dissipates rapidly as the parameters of the goals are 
expressed in greater relief.31   This breakdown is independent from and precedes any 
disagreement regarding implementation or institutional placement.
For example, Americans place great importance on the values of liberty and equality.32
However, the exact contours of these interests will vary significantly from person to person. To 
28
  In 2005 the national debate over the Terri Schiavo case added a new topic to the 
culture wars: the right to forego life-sustaining treatment.  See Howard Kurtz, Culture War,
WASH. POST, March 25, 2005, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A183-
2005Mar25.html (describing Schiavo case as “a full-fledged chapter in the culture wars”).
29
  The terms “Red state” and “Blue state” emerged as adjectives to describe a presumed 
set of political and personal values after the 2000 Presidential election.  Red State vs. Blue State 
Divide, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_states (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2005).  The designation of the color red or blue reflects the media charting of the 
outcome of the election where states that went for the Republican candidate for President were 
coded red and state which voted for the Democratic candidate were indicated in blue.  Id.  The 
terms have been expanded to represent a host of demographic and ideological differences.  Id.  
See Joyce Purnick, New York is So Lonely and So Blue, N.Y. TIMES, November 1, 2004, at B1 
(referring to New York as “a bright blue state”). 
30 See Francis J. Mootz, Jr., Book Review: Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming 
Reason in American Scholarship, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 605 (1998) (discussing split on law 
faculties regarding critical legal studies scholarship).
31
  Komesar recognizes this when he notes:  “Most people share an amorphous definition 
of the good that is part resource allocation efficiency (the size of the pie) and part equity (the 
division of the pie).”  Komesar, supra note 2, at 25.
32
  Liberty and equality are core democratic principles, enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence and protected by the U.S. Constitution.  See Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium: Law, 
Knowledge, and the Academy: Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV.1327 (2002) (noting law 
review editor required citation for proposition that “one of the values of American life is 
equality”).
11
one person, the notion of liberty may include the liberty to engage in adult consensual sex with 
individuals of the same sex.33  Thus, a weak version of the social goal of liberty would include, at 
a minimum, the eradication of criminal sanctions against consensual sodomy.34   A stronger 
version of this social goal would include uniform age of consent laws,35 consistent pro-gay sex 
education,36 and positive media portrayals.37 To the contrary, some individuals may conclude 
33
  The influential Wolfenden Report issued in Great Britain in 1957 is an example of the 
application of liberty principles to the criminalization of same-sex sexuality.  THE WOLFENDEN 
REPORT: THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND 
PROSTITUTION (1963).  The report recommended the de-criminalization of consensual same-sex 
activity based on the premise that the activity was not sufficiently other-regarding to merit 
interference by the law.  Id.
34
 The 1986 U.S. Supreme Court decision Bowers v. Hardwick held that the 
criminalization of same-sex sexuality did not violate the U.S. Constitution.  Bowers v. Hardwick 
478 U.S.186 (1986).  Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers in 2003.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 538 (2003).
35
 Some states impose higher ages of consent for same-sex sexuality.  See e.g., K.S.A. § 
21-3522(a) (2005) (restricting to opposite-sex couples a so-called “Romeo & Juliet” exception 
for children over 14 years of age and partners less than 19 years of age).  The application of this 
disparate age of consent was widely publicized when 18 year old Matthew Limon was sentenced 
to 17 years in jail for engaging in oral sex with a 14 year-old boy.  State v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 
(Kan. App. 2002).  If Limon and the boy had been of opposite sexes, Limon would have qualified 
for the “Romeo & Juliet” exception under which the maximum penalty would have been 13 to 15 
months, instead of the 206 months (17 years and two months) Limon received.  State v. Limon 
83 P.3d 299, 243 (Pierron, J., dissenting).  Immediately following Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme 
Court voted unanimously to vacate the judgment and remand the case for re-consideration in 
light of the new precedent.  Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003).  On remand, the conviction 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Kansas.  State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 299 (Kan .2004).  The 
case is currently pending before the Supreme Court of Kansas, State v. Limon, 204  Kan. LEXIS 
284 (2004). 
36
 Six states have statues that expressly require homosexuality to be taught in the public 
schools in a negative light.  ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8)(2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-
716(c)(1-3)(2004); LOUIS. REV. STAT. § 17:281(3)(2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-
171(1)(e)(2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5)(2004); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
163.002(8)(2004). Alabama and Texas require an emphasis that “homosexuality is not a lifestyle 
acceptable to the general public,” and Arizona bans any promotion of “a homosexual life-style.”  
ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(2005); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 163.002(2004); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 15-716(c)(1-3)(2004).  In addition, North Carolina provides that the basic education 
12
that homosexual sex is more analogous to alcoholism or drug abuse and, therefore, is not 
encompassed in views of liberty.38
A similar problem arises with the social goal of equality.  To some individuals who are 
committed to equality, gay men and lesbians should be granted workplace protections from 
discrimination.39  A stronger version of that view would include equal marriage rights and full 
recognition of same-sex partners.40 However, others individuals who share an abstract 
program must promote heterosexual marriage.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(2004).  The South 
Carolina statute provides: “The program for instruction . . . may not include a discussion of 
alternate sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships, including, but not limited to, 
homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction concerning sexually transmitted 
diseases.”  S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5)(2004).
37
  The Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation was founded in 1985.  GLAAD, Our 
History, at http://www.glaad.org/about/history.php (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).  It was originally 
organized to protest the media coverage of the first wave of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in New 
York City.  Id.  GLAAD is now a national organization dedicated to “promoting and ensuring 
fair, accurate and inclusive representation of people and events in the media as a means of 
eliminating homophobia and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation.” 
GLAAD, Our Mission, at http://www.glaad.org/about/history.php (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).  
38
  For a discussion of the traditional values movement’s construction of same-sex desire 
as a chosen, immoral, and unhealthy lifestyle analogous of other forms of addiction see Nancy J. 
Knauer, Science, and Identity, and the Constructive of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 LAW & 
SEX. 1, 46-50 (2003) (noting traditional values movement rejects comparisons of sexual 
orientation to race and contends “it more appropriate to compare homosexuality to alcoholism”). 
The traditional values movement advocates therapeutic intervention to liberate individuals who 
are mired in, what they consider to be, the destructive lifestyle of homosexuality.  Id. at 24-25 
(discussing reparative therapy).
39
  Based on Gallup polls results beginning in 1977, the public has steadily increased its 
support for equal workplace access for gay men and lesbians.  Ontario Consultants on Religious 
Tolerance, U.S. Public Opinion Polls on Homosexuality, at 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_poll2.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).  supra note 39.  In 
1977 only 56% of those surveyed thought that homosexuals should have “equal rights in terms of 
job opportunities,” and 33% thought they should not.  Id.  As of 2003, the number in favor of 
equal workplace rights had risen to 88%, with only 9% advocating unequal employment rights.  
Id.
40
  Although the percentage of respondents in favor of same-sex marriage or some other 
form of relationship recognition has also increased over time, the numbers lag far behind those in 
13
commitment to equality could label such protection or recognition “special rights” and, therefore, 
the antithesis of equality.41
As a theoretical construct, the assumption of consensus is useful to establish the 
applicability of CIA to public policy proposals beyond those firmly anchored in the goal of 
resource allocation efficiency.42  Indeed, much of Neil Komesar’s recent work on CIA has been 
designed to illustrate the applicability of CIA regardless of ideology. 43  In LAW’S LIMITS, 
Komesar demonstrates a variety of instances where CIA is an important (and some might agree 
essential) evaluative tool regardless of whether the social goal in question is resource allocation 
efficiency, equality, altruism, or liberty.44  He argues that the focus on participation – the 
atomistic forces that shape participation in alternative decision-making processes and thereby 
favor of equal workplace rights.  Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, U.S. Public 
Opinion Polls on Homosexuality, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_poll5.htm (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2005).  In 1996 only 26% were in favor of recognizing same-sex marriage or 
civil unions, with 67% opposed.  Id.  This number increased to 49% in favor and 49% opposed in 
May, 2003.  Id.  However, after Lawrence was decided in June 2003, there was a considerable 
backlash and the number in favor decreased to 37%.  Id.  A 2005 CNN/USA/Gallup poll shows a 
slim majority of 47% in favor of some form of relationship recognition with 45% favoring no 
relationship recognition.  Pollingreport.com, Law and Civil Rights, at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htmhttp://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Aug. 
27, 2005).
41
  For a discussion of the campaign by the traditional values movement to characterize 
anti-discrimination protections as “special rights” see Knauer, supra note 38, at 78-83 
(describing evolution and deployment of “special rights” rhetoric in legal battles).  See also,
HERMAN, supra note 11, at 133-36 (explaining development of “special rights strategy”).
42
  In LAW’S LIMITS, after discussing single institutionalism in the economic analysis of 
law, Komesar notes: “Anyone interested in promoting altruism and equality – like anyone 
interested in promoting resource allocation efficiency – must seriously address institutional 
choice or risk undercutting the goals that they seek.”  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 26.   
43
 See e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Law and Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground, 
Irreconcilable Differences, New Directions: Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and 
Institutional Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1997) (explaining his goal to convince “more legal 
analysts to focus on institutional choice”).
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determine institutional behavior – provides the necessary link that can cross ideological divides 
as wide as those existing between law and economics and civic republicanism.45   Participation, 
in turn, is a function of costs and benefits associated with the participation.46
The assumption of consensus also works well with the highly prescriptive nature of legal 
scholarship.47 Much legal scholarship is intent on providing detailed accounts of how certain 
issues of public policy should be resolved.48  The legal scholar’s persuasive techniques are 
typically restricted to the pages of law reviews and rely on argumentation and documentation.  
CIA allows the legal scholar to consider a full range of institutional options to implement the 
particular policy proposal, but does not require the legal scholar to assess the likelihood of such 
implementation or even the conditions under which implementation would be most feasible.49
44
  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 26.   
45
  With regard to the unifying nature of participation, Komesar writes:
Many seemingly diverse view or philosophies stress the importance of 
participation and the determinants of inadequate, incomplete or unequal 
participation.  Civic republicans stress greater and more equal participation as the 
core of the goals they seek.  The amount, pattern, and quality of participation 
define communitarian notions.  Resource allocation efficiency, a seemingly quite 
different societal goal, is also defined in terms of the completeness of 
participation . . .The central issues of “externality” and transaction costs are about 
the extent and quality of participation in the market . . .  Market failures are 
failures of participation. 
Id. at 65.
46 Id. at 30 (noting “[t]he character of institutional participation is determined by the 
interaction between the benefits of participation and the costs of participation”).
47 See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 1835, 1847 (1988) (noting “most distinctive feature of standard legal scholarship is its 
prescriptive voice”).
48
  Edward Rubin notes: “This prescriptive voice distinguishes legal scholarship from 
most other academic fields. The natural sciences and the social sciences characteristically adopt a 
descriptive stance, while literary critics adopt an interpretive one. Only moral philosophers seem 
to share the legal scholar's penchant for explicit prescription.”  Id. at 1848.
49
  Komesar focuses on the market, the courts, and the legislature.  Id. at 29 (noting “I 
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As discussed below, one of CIA’s most important contributions has been its insistence 
that institutional alternatives for the implementation of public policy measures include the market
and are not limited to the familiar three branches of government.50  This expansive view of 
institutional options has much to offer social movement theory.
B.  Single Institutionalism in Social Movement Theory
CIA considers social goals a priori.  Generally, the goals are articulated, identified, and 
championed by legal analysts independent of any discussion regarding the production of the 
goals or the social movements responsible for the advancement of the goals.51   Social movement 
theory can thus provide much of the back story that is missing from CIA because it focuses on 
the formation and development of social movements.52 In particular, the subset of social 
movement theory that studies questions of resource mobilization has considerable overlap with 
CIA’s emphasis on participation and share a common vocabulary.53
In turn, CIA can also offer social movement theory a valuable antidote for its particular 
tend to speak of three institutional alternatives – the market, the political process, and the courts 
or adjudicative process”).  However, he also mentions communities.  Id. at 31.  Finally, Komesar 
notes that the range of institutional options will vary depending upon the subject matter of the 
social goal.  Id. at 29 (stating range of alternatives will depend on “the subject studied and the 
inclinations of the investigator”).
50
  To the extent that goals are hardwired to institutions, designs for progressive social 
change do not generally attach to market-based solutions.
51
   As noted earlier, this lack of engagement with goal choice has provoked some 
comment.  See e.g., Barton, supra note 21, at 1177 (noting criticism); Buzbee, supra note 10, at 
514 (arguing for analysis of goal choice).
52
  William Eskridge argues that this back story should also be included in legal 
education.  Eskridge, supra note 24, at 419.  Eskridge reasons that law professors should 
“understand and teach [their] students more about social movement theories” in light of the 
movements’ influence on the evolution of both statutory and constitutional law.  Id.
53 See Rubin, supra note 12, at 28-34 (describing resource mobilization theory).
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brand of single institutionalism.54  Legal commentators have understandably approached the 
issue of social movements and social change from the perspective of legal reform.55  Indeed, the 
20th century saw remarkable changes in terms of both statutory law and Constitutional law that 
can be traced to the efforts of social movements.56  William Eskridge argues that social 
movement theory, as practiced by political scientists and sociologists, trivializes the importance 
of law, particularly that produced by the courts.57 In a related debate, legal scholars have actively 
disputed the competency of the courts to effect meaningful social change.58
54
  In the case of social movement theory advanced by legal scholars, the label of single 
institutionalism could be used to refer to the singular focus on the courts, rather than the failure 
to interrogate alternative institutional options.
55 Id. at 2 (explaining emphasis by reference to legal scholars’ “unity of discourse with 
the judiciary, which creates a mentality that tends to assimilate the style of legal analysis to 
arguments before a court”). 
56 See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 419 (asserting strong influence of social movements 
over statutory and Constitutional law).
57
  Eskridge states “[t]he social movements literature does not adequately reflect the 
importance of law.”  Id. at 420.  Although Eskridge discusses the influence of social movements 
on the evolution of statutory law, his ultimate focus is the “constitutionalization” of social 
movements.  Id.  at 479.   
58
  Gerald Rosenberg’s 1991 book HOLLOW HOPE challenged the wisdom of the 
instrumental use of litigation to effect social change.  ROSENBERG, supra note 25.  Rosenberg’s 
argument challenged view that had been popularized by Joel Handler’s influential 1978 book 
titled, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE.  JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW 
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978) (outlining instrumental use of litigation to secure social 
change).  Handler had concluded “use of litigation as an instrument of social reform [has] 
become so widespread that it can be called a movement.”  Id.  Rosenberg’s book was critiqued 
heavily for its methodology.   See e.g., Neal Devines, Review Essay: Judicial Matters, 80 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1027 (1992) (criticizing Rosenberg’s claim of “judicial impotence” and his 
methodology); Peter H. Shuck, Book Review: Public Law and Litigation, 102 YALE L. J. 1763 
(1993)(criticizing Rosenberg’s methodology).  Rosenberg’s work has recently been cited by 
advocates of “popular constitutionalism,” which has sparked its own debate.  See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of 
Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, at 676 (2004) (rejecting popular 
constitutionalism).  See contra MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
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CIA starts with the assumption that the social goals advanced by a particular social 
movement could find expression in a variety of institutional settings.59  Thus, it short circuits the 
juricentrism endemic among legal scholars.   In addition, CIA provides an emphasis on 
implementation that is arguably lacking in the resource mobilization literature.60  This focus on 
alternatives for implementation would address the tendency to trivialize law identified by 
Eskridge without necessarily asserting the primacy of law and the courts.61  As such, CIA could 
help advance social movement theory by addressing how social movements effect social change, 
not simply how social movements form or how social movements effect the law.62
The juricentric approach of legal scholars can unintentionally collapse an entire social 
movement into a platform for legal reform.63  The current social movement for the recognition of 
COURTS 154, 169 (1999) (advocating end of most judicial review); Larry D. Kramer, Popular 
Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (2004) (presenting overview of new
scholarship on popular constitutionalism).
59
  After discussing various theories of property, Komesar writes:
Virtually nothing follows from the choice of goal or of a general philosophy of 
property.  You cannot hardwire goals and institutions and, therefore, no program 
of law and public policy follows from goal choice.  The simple correlations 
between goals and institutions that characterize so many ideological positions 
simply do not hold.  Institutional choice, at least institutional choice at high 
numbers and complexity, is filled with paradoxes and counterintuitive 
combinations of goals and institutions.
KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 153.
60 See Rubin, supra note 12, at 2-3 (noting that political scientists and legal scholars 
study “different parts of [the] phenomena” of social movements). 
61
   As noted earlier, Eskridge argues that “social movements literature does not 
adequately reflect the importance of law.”  Id. at 420.
62
   As Edward Rubin explains, political scientists are concerned with the former, whereas 
legal scholars focus on the latter.  Rubin, supra note 12, at 2-3.
63
  Tomiko Brown-Nagin argues persuasively for the need to distinguish campaigns for 
legal reform from social movements.  Brown-Nagin, supra note 25, at 1502-03.  Brown-Nagin 
notes that “[t]hose who champion the centrality of law to social movements or advance the 
concept of legal mobilization wrongly conflate politicized legal campaigns with ‘social 
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same-sex relationships is a prime example of this.  It would be foolish to argue that laws 
restricting marriage to one man and one woman are not an important and particularly potent 
source of inequality and oppression.64  However, the law is not the source of the oppression; it is 
merely an expression of it. 65 The regulation of same-sex desire has been enforced through a 
variety of overlapping and mutually reinforcing prohibitions that originate in religion, medicine, 
and the law.66  These prohibitions reflect certain social values and goals.  Express laws regulating 
same-sex conduct are relatively new and date from the mid 20th century.67 Accordingly, legal 
reform will not be sufficient to achieve equality for and recognition of same-sex relationships nor 
will legal reform occur unless it is preceded by social change.68  When legal scholars foreground 
the legal definition and regulation of minority groups, they are only telling part of the story.69
movements.’”  Id. at 1502.  She attributes the tendency to view campaigns for legal reform as 
interchangeable with social movements to the wide acceptance of Joel Handler’s views on cause 
lawyering and the efficacy of litigation to achieve social change as outlined in his influential 
1978 book, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM.  HANDLER, supra note 58.  In an effort 
to stress the importance of cause-directed litigation, Handler declared that use of such litigation 
to secure change constituted a “movement.”  Id.
64
  For example, 44 states now expressly restrict marriage to opposite sex couples.  See 
infra note 231 (describing state laws restricting marriage).
65 See Nancy J. Knauer, Symposium: Lawrence v. Texas: When “Profound and Deep 
Convictions” Collide with Liberty Interests, 10 CARDOZO. WOM. L. J. 325, 336 (2004) (arguing 
“criminal status of homosexual conduct was never the only justification for the social and legal 
disabilities imposed on gay men and lesbians”). 
66 See Knauer, supra note 38, at 11-12 (discussing “discourse of sin and transgression 
which stubbornly continues to define same-sex desire”).    
67
 For example, sodomy laws restricted to same-sex sodomy did not appear until 1969.  
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 210 (1999) 
(referring to such laws as Aa novelty, not showing up in state sodomy law until 1969").   The 
majority in Lawrence recognized the relatively recent appearance of same-sex restrictions.  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (stating “there is no longstanding history in this 
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter”).
68 See supra note 65. 
69
   Tomiko Brown-Nagin notes that when legal scholarship fails to engage “the 
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Indeed, the early gay liberation movement targeted medicine as the primary institutional 
source of oppression, not the law.70 The continued diagnosis of homosexuality as a mental 
illness was used as a justification for a wide range of legal and social disabilities imposed on 
homosexuals, not to mention the potential loss of liberty or invasive medical “treatment.”71
Clearly, the declassification of homosexuality as a mental disability by the American Psychiatric 
Association in 1973 was a necessary step toward equality.72  Contrary to what some activists 
believed at the time, however, it was not a sufficient step to secure equality.73 After 
formation, organization, evolution, strategies and tactics of social movements[,]” it “simplifies 
and flattens these movements into static repositories or mirrors of legal epistemologies, norms, 
and processes.”  Brown-Nagin, supra note 58, at 1492.  This failure to engage “overlooks the 
interactive and temporal dimensions of a social movement's engagement with law.”  This result 
is that “law envelops and defines the movements[.]”  Id.
70
   The primacy of medicine in the definition of gay men and lesbians during the early 
gay liberation movement challenges the centrality of law to minority identity-based social 
movements as advocated by Eskridge.  See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 422.  Eskridge argues that 
“[l]egal rules and their enforcers strongly reinforced stigmas and disadvantages that not only 
provided important incentives and goals for minorities, but helped give concrete meaning to the 
“minority group” itself.”  Id.  For the purposes of CIA, the primacy of medicine also provides an 
example of an instance where the appropriate range of institutional options for the 
implementation of a social goal would diverge from the standard trio of the courts, the 
legislature, and the market.  See supra note 49 (discussing variation of institutional options 
depending on subject matter). 
71
 First published in 1952, the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM- I) included homosexuality as one of the most severe sociopathic personality 
disorders. Knauer, supra note 38, at 20.  The classification of homosexuality as a mental illness 
emerged in the 1930s, a result of the growing popularity of Freudian psychoanalytic theory.  Id. 
at 18-22.  At that point, “the pathologizing of psychiatry and the promise of a cure influenced 
both the criminal law and public policy regarding homosexuality[.]”  Id. at 20. (discussing sexual 
psychopath laws and indeterminate commitments).
72 See  RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF 
DIAGNOSIS 71-88 (1981) (describing early efforts to change diagnosis).
73 See Knauer, supra note 38, at 25-27 (discussing slow pace of change after 
declassification).  Of course, this statement in no way is intended to detract from the importance 
of the declassification.  As one newspaper reported: “20 Million Homosexuals Gain Instant Cure. 
SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE: THE USE AND ABUSE OF RESEARCH INTO HOMOSEXUALITY 224 
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declassification, the legal disabilities did not only fail to melt away; they multiplied.74
The 2003 U.S. Supreme Court decision Lawrence v. Texas provides a similar lesson.75
Despite the prognostications of Justice Scalia, the recognition of a protected liberty interest in a 
choice of an intimate partner of the same-sex has not led to the wholesale recognition of same-
sex marriage rights.76  The criminalization of same-sex sodomy was an important feature of the 
regulation of same-sex desire, but was not the only source of justification for the continued 
regulation.77 Since the decision, the supreme court of one state has cited Lawrence as supporting 
same-sex marriage,78 whereas the supreme court of a second state found that Lawrence did not 
require equal marriage rights.79
(1996) (quoting headline from Philadelphia newspaper reporting declassification of 
homosexuality as a mental disease).  The continuing stigma of diagnosis was a significant 
impediment to advancing an agenda for LGBT rights.
74
 In many instances, the restraining force of heteronormativity made specific laws 
targeting gay men and lesbians unnecessary.  Knauer, supra note 38, at 50 (noting “more 
specifically anti-gay legislation than ever before”).
75
  Lawrence v. Texas, 339 U.S. 558 (2003).  
76 Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating majority’s “reasoning leaves on pretty shaky 
grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite couples”). 
77
   The fact that it was constitutionally permissible to criminalize homosexual conduct 
under Bowers v, Hardwick served as justification for denying equal rights to gay men and 
lesbians.  Justice Scalia explained this reasoning in his dissent in Romer v. Evans.  Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia wrote: “If it is rational to 
criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to those with a 
self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct.  Indeed, where criminal sanctions are 
not involved, homosexual Aorientation@ is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.”  Id. at 
644.  Justice Scalia argued that the Coloradans who had passed Amendment 2 were “entitled to 
be hostile toward homosexual conduct” in light of Bowers v. Hardwick , even though Colorado 
had repealed its sodomy statute. Id.   
78 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
limiting access to protections and benefits of civil marriage violates state constitution and citing 
Lawrence approvingly).
79
   In Standhardt v. MCSC, the Arizona Supreme Court let stand an appellate court 
decision that distinguished Lawrence v. Texas and found that it did not require equal marriage 
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Although the legal regimes defining and regulating minority interests can be breathtaking 
in their totality, law is part of a larger multi-institutional web of regulation that reflects social 
values and goals.80 When legal scholars engage in noncontextual or single institutional analysis, 
they risk a type of formalism that reinforces the power of the regime they are attempt ing to 
dismantle.81 Exclusive focus on legal doctrine can obscure the instrumental nature of 
discriminatory laws and rules.  Without an acknowledgement that law reflects values and social 
goals, continued inequality can be seen as simply the result of a glitch in accepted legal reasoning 
that will be resolved with greater clarity as legal doctrines inevitably mature.  This conveys a 
false optimism regarding the natural evolution of the law.  It also absolves the atomistic forces 
whose participation created the demand for the discriminatory laws in the first place.  The source 
of inequality is incorrectly understood to be the faceless autonomous force of law, instead of the 
family next door and the church down the street.  
Finally, when a social movement is collapsed into a program of legal reform, the concept 
of the law ceases to be what Tomiko Brown-Nagin refers to as “inspirational” and becomes 
rights.  Standhardt v. MCSC,  2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62 (Ariz., May 25, 2004).  The intermediate 
appellate court reasoned that Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right to engage in same-
sex sexual activity.  Stanhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 457 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2003).
80
 For example, the regulation of same-sex desire can be seen as primarily a morality 
discourse which distinguishes the stigma attached to homosexuality from other minority groups.  
Michael Warner explains that A[t]here have always been moral prescriptions about how to be a 
woman or a worker or an Anglo-Saxon; but not whether to be one.@  Michael Warner, 
Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY at xxi (Michael 
Warner ed., 1993).  The centrality of morality highlights the possibility that religion and 
communities would be important alternative institutional settings for goal choice 
implementation.  See supra note 49 (discussing alternative institutional settings).
81
 One is reminded of Audre Lorde’s admonition that “the master tools will never 
dismantle the master’s house.”  AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110-13 
(1984) (essay entitled “The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House).
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“definitional.”82  Brown argues that this can strip a social movement of its “insurgent value.”83  It 
effectively cedes the power of self-definition to the very regime that enforced the subjugation.84
This definitional outcome was apparent when, in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick,85 LGBT 
rights litigation increasingly attempted to present a meaningful distinction between the status of 
being homosexual and the act of engaging in homosexual conduct.86  Although the bifurcation of 
status from conduct seemed to be a necessary concession in light of the criminalization of same-
sex sexuality,87 it created an ultimately disempowering image of homosexuals who were 
completely divorced from expressions of their sexuality and denied protection for them.88  This 
82
  Brown-Nagin, supra note 24, at 1510-1518 (explaining distinction).
83
  Brown-Nagin argues “social movements that make litigation definitional to their 
agendas threaten their insurgent role in the political process.”  Id. at 1511.  She continues: 
“[w]ithout an insurgent element, social movements lose their agenda-setting ability.”  Id.
84
  Brown-Nagin observes that “[t]he one-dimensional identity that the law of equal 
protection and interest group politics imposes on “suspect” racial classes is deeply problematic 
for claims of distributive justice  . . . It limits the goals of political struggle and legal agenda to 
those objectives preferred by and most useful to elites.”  Id. at 1492.  Brown-Nagin defines the 
term “elites” as “those with superior status based on social standing, wealth, intellect, or 
identification with high status institutions, including governmental or political, educational, or 
commercial institutions.”  Id.  n.12.
85
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  Bowers v. Hardwick upheld the 
constitutionality of criminal sodomy statutes, holding that homosexual sodomy was not protected 
under the constitutional right of privacy in light of our nation=s history and tradition.  Id.
86
  For a discussion of the bifurcation of status from conduct as a litigation strategy see 
Knauer, supra note 38, at 54.
87 See Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1737 (1993).
88
   Edward Stein has pointed out that gay men and lesbians suffer legal and social 
disabilities on account of their actions and not their sexual orientation or identity.  He writes:
. . . lesbians and gay men deserve protection against discrimination and positive 
rights with respect to their actions and decisions rather than for their mere 
orientations.  It is when they engage in same-gender sexual acts, identify as gay 
men and lesbians, and create lesbian and gay families that they especially need 
protections for and rights based on choices that build on their underlying (and 
perhaps immutable) desires.
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de-sexualized notion of a status homosexual was vigorously advanced in litigation designed to 
secure suspect classification under the Equal Protection clause, as court papers increasingly
asserted that sexual orientation was an innate and unchangeable identity.89  During this period, a
rising percentage of the general public came to understand sexual orientation as inborn rather 
than chosen, begging the question of which came first, the identity or the litigation strategy?90
C. The Nature of Choice
Once CIA is expanded to acknowledge the contested nature of many social goals, its 
potential application to the study of social movements becomes obvious.  As discussed in the 
preceding section, the comparative frame of CIA addresses the single institutionalism that results 
from an over emphasis of the courts and their importance in effecting social change.  Moreover, 
the behavior of social movements can inform the notion of institutional choice which is at the 
core of CIA.  As opposed to the omniscient prescriptive stance adopted by legal commentators 
applying CIA to their policy proposals, social movements practice CIA as a strategic means to 
achieve their social goals.  The evaluation incorporates three general considerations: competency, 
STEIN, supra note 5, at 295.
89
 This was particularly true in the case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” litigation challenging 
the U.S. military’s regulations against servicemembers revealing their sexual orientation.  
Litigants argued unsuccessfully that a statement of “I’m gay” did not indicate any propensity on 
the part of the speaker to engage in same-sex sodomy.  Knauer, supra note 38, at 57-61.  As Janet 
Halley noted, unless the servicemember “is truly and contentedly celibate,” this litigation 
strategy “is an insult to the personal sexual dignity of most servicemember clients.”  JANET 
HALLEY, DON=T: A READER=S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY=S ANTI-GAY POLICY 125 (1999).
90 See EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS 
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 230 (1999) (discussing increase in number of people who ascribe a 
biologic or genetic cause to homosexuality).  Id.  According to a 1977 Gallup poll, only 13 
percent of Americans believed that homosexuality was inborn.  Mark Schoofs, Straight to Hell, 
VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 11, 1998, at 56.  That number had increased to 31 percent by 1996.  Id.  By 
2001, the number of respondents who believed that homosexuality is something “a person is born 
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responsiveness, and resilience. The result is not so much a singular “choice” as it is a ranking of 
institutional options.91
Movements working for social change cannot afford the luxury of single institutionalism 
that is practiced by and debated by legal commentators.92 Even the relevant institutions will 
change, depending on the social movement and its particular vectors of oppression.93  As noted 
above, the early gay liberation movement had to target medicine, specifically psychiatry, in order 
to advance its social goals.94  Religion, education, and the media could also be counted as 
institutions with particular relevance to LGBT rights and recognition.95   In addition, the LGBT 
movement has placed great importance on the power of individuals to change attitudes by being 
open and honest about their sexual orientation.96
with” had risen to 40 percent.  See, Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, supra note 39.
91
  For example, the conclusion that the federal courts are not as responsive as certain 
private employers to demands for relationship recognition would not suggest an abandonment of 
the courts.  Because the oppression of gay men and lesbians originates in multiple sites, there is 
no rescue institution capable to mandate systemic and immediate social change.
92
  This is particularly true when dealing with a group of high stakes individuals, such as 
the men and women working for relationship recognition who are in same-sex relationships.  For 
a discussion of the distribution of stakes see infra text accompanying notes 141-144.
93
  Komesar recognizes that the relevant institutions “will change depending upon the 
subject studied and the inclinations of the investigator.”  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 29.
94
  The efforts to win the declassification of homosexuality as a mental illness preceded 
the marriage litigation.  The decision to target psychiatry was made by the fledgling homophile 
organizations even in advance of the Stonewall Riots.  BAYER, supra note 72, at 91.  Pickets 
began to appear at psychiatric and medical meetings as early as 1968.  Id. at 92.  Gay activists 
escalated the lobbying efforts throughout the early 1970s.  Id. at 105-06.
95
   The LGBT movement devotes considerable resources to each of these institutions, 
with varying levels of success.  The evaluation of these alternative institutions through the lens of 
CIA is beyond the scope of the Essay and necessarily a project for another day.
96
  The notion of “coming out” and declaring one’s sexuality is very important for an 
otherwise invisible minority.  A public avowal of homosexuality is considered to help identity 
formation and to operate as a public good with potentially transformative power.  George 
Chauncey writes: “coming out to heterosexuals became a new moral imperative, an existentialist 
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As any activist knows, a program of legal reform that involves sharply contested, or 
simply unpopular, social goals can not succeed without some degree of strategic planning 
involving elements of both education and persuasion.97 This necessitates a multi-institutional 
approach. For example, the early marriage cases brought by same-sex couples in the 1970’s were 
long considered anomalies, more a reflection of guerilla conscience-raising tactics than a 
reasoned litigation strategy.98  For twenty years, same-sex marriage disappeared as the movement 
grappled with other concerns, not the least of which was an internal debate regarding the very 
desirability of marriage as a social goal.99  When marriage demands reappeared in the 1990’s, 
act of witness to a truth of onself[.]”  GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY 
SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 33 (2004).  
97
  For example, the mission statement of the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the largest 
LGBT lobbying organization in the United States, describes its activities as follows:  “The 
Human Rights Campaign effectively lobbies Congress; mobilizes grassroots action in diverse 
communities; invests strategically to elect a fair-minded Congress; and increases public 
understanding through innovative education and communication strategies.” Human Rights 
Campaign, supra note 97.
98
 There were several same-sex marriage cases that date from the early 1970s around the 
same time when states began adopting Equal Rights Amendments and ratification of the federal 
Equal Rights Amendment was pending before the states.  Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 
(Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 
1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974).  See CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, ay 
146-47 (describing Equal Rights Amendment).  The claims for equal marriage rights were 
rejected largely on definitional grounds: marriage can only exist between a man and a woman.  
See e.g., infra note 193 (discussing Jones v. Hallahan).
99
  Marriage is still not a universal goal among men and women in same-sex relationships. 
Pam Belluck, with Katie Zezima, Gays Respond: 'I Do,' 'I Might' And 'I Won't,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2003, at 1A (gauging reaction to impending legalization of same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts).  The debate within the LGBT community over marriage can be traced to an 
exchange that took place between Paula Ettlebrick and Tom Stoddard in responsive articles in 
OUT Magazine.  Paula Ettlebrick, Since When was Marriage a Path to Liberation? in LESBIANS, 
GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401-05 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993); Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay 
People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 401-05 (William 
B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).  Some criticism of marriage goals has suggested that marriage would 
lead to a “domestication” of same-sex relationships.  See e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN 
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they were part of an orchestrated litigation strategy that targeted certain jurisdictions and actively 
discouraged litigious couples from filing court cases in jurisdictions with less favorable 
outlooks.100
It would have been folly for the early gay rights movement to pursue marriage litigation 
in the 1970s.   At the time, the prohibitions against same-sex relationships were pervasive, being 
grounded in religion, medicine, and law.101  Education and the media helped enforce these 
prohibitions through either silence or highly negative and stereotypical portrayals.102  Although 
litigants pointed out that the challenged marriage laws did not specify that the couple had to 
consist of a man and a woman, the force of heteronormativity was such that courts ruled against 
the same-sex couples on definitional grounds.103  No other reading of marriage was possible.  By 
(OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 18 (1992) (describing “unthinkable assimilation 
of domestication”).
100 David J. Garrow, Toward a More Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES SUN. MAG., May 9, at 
52 (describing evolution of coordinated same-sex marriage litigation).
101
  Homosexuality was classified as a serious mental illness until December 1973.  
BAYER, supra note 72, at 123.  Throughout the 1970s, states began to repeal their sodomy laws, 
but the process was slow.  Ten years after declassification only the following states had repealed 
their sodomy laws: Illinois (1962), Connecticut (1971), Colorado (1972), Oregon (1972), 
Delaware (1973), North Dakota (1973), Ohio (1974), New Hampshire (1975), New Mexico 
(1975), California (1976), Maine (1976), West Virginia (1976), Washington (1976), Indiana 
(1977), South Dakota (1977), Vermont (1977), Wyoming (1977), Iowa (1978), Nebraska (1978), 
New Jersey (1979), Alaska (1980), Wisconsin (1983).  Jeremy Quittner, Are You Breaking the 
Law? Where Does Your State Stand on Sodomy Laws? THE ADVOCATE, Aug. 20, 2002, at 52. 
102
 Chauncey notes that “it was only in the 1990s that lesbian and gay images, often 
positive and increasingly diverse and complex, permeated the mass media[.]”  CHAUNCEY, supra 
note 96, at 53.  On college campuses, LGBT groups proliferated, but often met with considerable 
resistance from the administration.  See infra note 154 (discussing student group litigation).
103
 For Example, in Jones v. Hallhan, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had only to 
consult two dictionaries to determine that the failure to issue a marriage license to Marjorie Jones 
and Tracey Knight did not implicate any constitutional rights.  Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 
588 (1973).  True, the state statute did not specify that the applicants for a marriage license had to 
be of opposite sexes.  Id. at 589.  That notwithstanding, the court concluded that by definition 
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definition, marriage could only exist between a man and a woman.104
Obviously, quite a bit had changed by 1993 when the Supreme Court of Hawaii found 
that the denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated the equal protection clause of 
the state constitution and the state of Hawaii had failed to show a compelling state interest to 
justify that violation.105 During those two intervening decades, the LGBT movement had started 
a dialogue with organized religion,106 lobbied successfully for the declassification of 
homosexuality as a mental illness,107 and secured legal gains such as the repeal of sodomy 
laws,108 anti-discrimination measures,109 and hate crimes legislation.110  It campaigned for 
positive portrayals of gay men and lesbians in the media and educational materials.111 In short, it 
pursued a very broad inter-related program of social change.  At the same time, the LGBT 
movement saw the rise of the traditional values movement that countered every gain and made 
Jones and Knight could not marry.  Id.  The judge reasoned: “It appears to us that appellants are 
prevented from marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court 
Clerk of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of entering 
into a marriage as that term is defined.”  Id.
104
  Despite the obviousness of this reasoning, state legislatures began to enact sex-
specific marriage laws in the wake of these early marriage cases.  CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 
91.  Chauncey reports that 15 states passed such legislation.  Id.
105
  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).   
106 See CHAUNCEY, supra note 96 (noting religious views regarding homosexuality began 
to change in 1970s in favor of anti-discrimination laws).
107 See generally, BAYER, supra note 72 (describing lobbying for declassification)
108 See supra note 101 (discussing state repeal of sodomy laws).  
109 See CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 38-39 (discussing anti-discrimination protections)
110 See generally, Human Rights Campaign, Hate Crimes, at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Hate_Crimes1 (last visited Aug. 27, 2005) 
(discussing need for and progress toward securing hate crime protections).
111
   The Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation was founded in 1985.  GLAAD, 
supra note 38.  The Gay,  Lesbian, and Straight Education Network was founded in 1990 to 
address the needs of LGBT students.  GLSEN, History, at http://www.glsen.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/all/about/history/index.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).  
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particularly effective use of the citizens’ referendum.112 Over time, this counter movement 
evolved from a narrowly drawn anti- gay focus to espouse a much more comprehensive vision for 
social change and transformation.113
Throughout the 1990s, however, the largest gains with respect to the recognition of same-
sex relationships came from the market in the form of domestic partnership benefits as employers 
began to extend the equivalent of spousal health insurance and other benefits to the same-sex 
partners of their employees.114 Indeed, the practice coined the term “domestic partnership,” and
now the term “domestic partner” or more simply “partner” are wide ly used outside the Human 
Relations departments of corporations to signal an exclusive committed intimate relationship.115
112 For a description of the rise of the traditional values movement see CHAUNCEY, supra 
note 96, at 147-52 (describing the history of movement).
113 HERMAN, supra note 11, at 195 (describing traditional values movement as a 
“paradigmatic movement for social change”).  
114
 According to the Human Rights Campaign Foundation, 11 state governments and 129 
municipal or county governments extend domestic partnership benefits.  Human Rights 
Campaign Foundation, Employers that Offer Domestic Partnership Health Benefits, at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search_the_Database&Template=/CustomSource/W
orkNet/srch.cfm&searchtypeid=3&searchSubTypeID=1 (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).  In addition, 
244 of the Fortune 500 companies offer domestic partnership benefits.  Id. In order to qualify for 
these employee benefits, a same-sex couple must establish either that they are registered as 
domestic partners with the relevant jurisdiction or they must satisfy a prescribed number of 
factors establishing a relationship.  See Knauer, supra note 21, at 46-48 (1998) (describing 
general requirements to qualify for domestic partnership benefits).  
On the municipal or county level, domestic partner ordinances can extend relatively few 
benefits to non-employees.  Id. at 340-42.  Domestic partner registries are largely symbolic, 
although registration does provide strong evidence of a committed relationship.  Id. at 340-41. 
According to the Human Rights Campaign Foundation, 69 municipalities and counties offer 
registries.  Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Work Life: Search for an Organization or 
Agency, at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Get_Informed2&Template=/CustomSource/Agency/
AgencySearch.cfm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).  However, the increasing availability of registries 
may lead to a negative inference in the case of a couple who fails to register.
115
  For example, one definition of “domestic partner” provides: “domestic partner or 
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The willingness of the gay rights movement to pursue marketplace solutions illustrates that 
activists do not “hardwire” institutions to their goals, a common criticism the CIA wages against 
legal commentators.116  Speaking in the broadest of ideological terms, and assuming that 
designations such as “left” or “right” retain some modicum of descriptive power, movements to 
secure rights and recognition for traditionally marginalized minority groups are generally 
considered to fall to the “left” of center, whereas the private orderings and remedies of the 
marketplace are more closely associated with the “right.”117  In fact, the efforts to secure 
domestic partnership benefits were considered suspect by some and exposed the LGBT 
movement to internal criticism, showing yet again how politics can make strange bedfellows.118
As explained more fully in Part IV, the amount of resources the LGBT movement 
expended on domestic partnership protections was also criticized given that market-based 
recognition provides a very partial remedy.119  In other words, as an institution, the market is not 
competent to implement the social goal of equal recognition for same-sex relationships.120
Despite this partiality, the market has been very responsive to demands for equal treatment of 
domestic partnership identifies the personal relationship between individuals who are living 
together and sharing a common domestic life together but are not joined in any type of legal 
partnership, marriage or civil unions.”  WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYLPODIEA, Domestic 
Partnership, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domestic_partner (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).
116
  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 174-75 (noting “you cannot hardwire goals and 
institutions and, therefore, no program of law and public policy follows from goal choice”).  
117 Id. at 92 (pointing to the label “conservative” as a “ideological generalization” that 
“misses much”).
118 See Knauer, supra note 21, at 349 n.56 (describing fear of “domestication”).
119
  The remedy is partial because it is limited to the employees of certain employers and 
does not confer rights that are enforceable against third parties.  The class of individuals 
benefited does not include the unemployed or the underemployed.  The type of benefits available 
is limited to those generally associated with compensation packages. 
120
  For a discussion of competence see infra text accompanying notes 200-27.
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same-sex partners and relatively resilient to attempts by the traditional values movement to 
protest through the use of consumer boycotts and the like.121  This placed the LGBT movement 
in the paradoxical situation where the institution that was the most responsive to its demands and 
able to withstand pressure from the traditional values counter-movement was the least competent 
to provide the desired relief.122
The key to CIA is the element of participation, and from its inception the LGBT 
movement has recognized the importance of the atomistic forces that determine institutional 
behavior.123   It is individuals who demand discriminatory legislation, support citizen referenda to 
repeal gay rights legislation, fire employees based on sexual orientation, determine the “best 
interest” of a child, and commit violent hate crimes.124   These things are not the product of the 
neutral, albeit misguided, Law.  They are choices made by individuals.  As such, the LGBT
movement stresses the importance of individuals to “come out” and be open and honest 
121
  For example, the 16 million member strong Southern Baptist Convention organized a 
boycott of the Walt Disney Company shortly after the company began to offer domestic partner 
benefits.  Gustav Niebuhr, Baptists Censure Disney for Gay-Spouse Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, June 
13, 1996, at A14.  The boycott was largely regarded as a failure and ended eight years later.  See 
Baptists End Disney Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, JUNE 23, 2005, at A17 (quoting Southern Baptist 
Convention “'The boycott has communicated effectively our displeasure concerning products and 
policies that violate moral righteousness and traditional family values”). 
122
  Komesar notes:  “The world of institutional choice under high numbers and 
complexity B the real world B yields incomplete and paradoxical results.  Simplistic associations 
of good and evil with particular institutions and ideologies as well as demands for perfection no 
longer fit.”  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 121 (discussing paradoxical results).
123 See supra note 96, at 33 (discussing presumed transformative power of “coming 
out”).
124
  The “best interests” of the child is a family concept used to determine issues of 
custody and adoption.  Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: 
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 341, 364-68 
(2002) (explaining “best interests” interests). Its multifactor analysis frequently denied custody 
to parents in same-sex relationships even where courts did not consider such parents to be unfit 
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regarding their sexual orientation because public opinion polls regularly show that individuals 
who know that they know someone who is gay are more likely to support gay rights initiatives.125
Thus, the LGBT movement not only pursues its contested goal through strategic institutional 
choice, it also seeks to build consensus, or at least a majority, regarding the contested goal.  
Through the use of personal narrative, the coming out process seeks to achieve this by reaching 
one atomistic actor at a time. 
III. THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
2004 was a tumultuous year for the recognition of same-sex relationships. Despite many 
procedural challenges and a pending state constitutional referendum, Massachusetts became the 
first state to legalize same-sex marriage, as mandated by a 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court 
decision.126 Several weeks before the Massachusetts order became effective, the Mayor of San 
Francisco, Gavin Newsom, authorized the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.127
Night after night, television news programs showed long lines outside City Hall where couples 
per se.  Id.
125 See Human Rights Campaign, Coming Out as a Straight Ally, at 
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Coming_Out/Get_Informed4/Straight_Allies/Comi
ng_Out_as_a_Straight_Ally2.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2005) (stating “Opinion polls show that 
people who know someone who is gay or lesbian are more likely to support equal rights for all 
gay and lesbian people”).
126 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
limiting access to protections and benefits of civil marriage violates state constitution).
127
 In advance of the implementation of the Goodridge decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, the Mayor of San Francisco authorized the issuance of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couple starting in February 2004.  Dean E. Murphy, Bid to Stop San Francisco From 
Letting Gays Marry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A10.  By the time the California courts 
enjoined the practice one month later, 4,037 same-sex couple from 46 states had married.  Dean 
E. Murphy, San Francisco Married 4,037 Same-Sex Pairs from 46 States, N.Y. TIMES, March 
18, 2004, at A2.  The Supreme Court of California later declared the marriages invalid.  Lockyer 
v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Calif. 2004).  
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patiently waited for hours as volunteer officiants scrambled to meet the pent up demand.128  For a 
brief time, it appeared as if the United States had reached a tipping point.  Bursts of localism led 
municipal officials to follow suit in Oregon,129 New Jersey,130 New Mexico,131 and New York.132
 Over 8,000 same-sex couples were “married” before the courts intervened and invalidated the 
marriages as ultra vires.133
The media images of the happy newlyweds energized the traditional values movement,
and same-sex marriage became a defining issue for the 2004 Presidential election.134 Faced with 
128
  Carolyn Marshall, Rushing to Say ‘I Do’ Before City is Told ‘You Can’t,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2004, at A10 (noting staff and volunteers workers through three-day weekend without 
pay).
129
 On March 3, 2004, “Oregon’s largest county, Multnomah [County] began issuing 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.”  Matthew Peusch, Oregonians Look to One Suit to Settle 
Gay Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 2004, at A16.  More than three thousands marriage 
licenses were issued to same-sex couples in Oregon before the state courts stopped the practice.  
Matthew Peusch, Oregon: Judge Halts Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, N. Y. TIMES, April 21, 
2004, at A21.  The Oregon Supreme Court later invalidated the marriages.  Li v. State, 110 P.3d 
91 (2005).
130
 On March 10, 2004, Asbury Park, New Jersey issued a marriage license to a same-sex 
couple.  Thomas Crampton, A City on the Jersey Shore, Wading Into Gay Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
March 13, 2004, at B4.
131
  Sandoval County, New Mexico issued 66 marriage licenses to same-sex couples on 
February 20, 2004.  Steve Barnes, New Mexico: Gay Marriage Injunction Stands, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2004, at A15.  The state courts quickly enjoined the issuance.  Id.
132
 A number of marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples in New Paltz, New 
York, and the mayor personally performed 25 same-sex marriages.  Thomas J. Lueck, Police 
Charge New Paltz Mayor for Marrying Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 2004, at B4.
The mayor was charged with 24 misdemeanors when he presided over 25 same-sex marriage 
ceremonies.  Id.  The charges were eventually dropped after 18 months of legal maneuvering.  
Jennifer Medina, Charges Dropped Against Mayor Who Performed Gay Weddings, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2005, at B5 
133
 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (CA 2004) (invalidating 
over 4,000 marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples by San Francisco);  Li v. State, 110 P.3d 
91 (2005) (invalidating over 3,000 marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in Oregon). 
134 See WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex_marriage_in_the_United_States (last visited Aug. 29, 
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the specter of same-sex marriage spreading throughout the United States via the Aactivist judges@
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, anti-gay activists redoubled their 
efforts to use the constitutional amendment process, on both the federal and state levels, to stop 
court-mandated equal marriage rights.135 In 2004, voters in 13 states, representing a large 
percentage of the U.S. electorate, approved state constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.136  A Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) was introduced in Congress, with the 
support of the President.137 The response against same-sex marriage was so overwhelming that 
leading Democrats publicly blamed Newsom for the re-election of President Bush, claiming that 
Newsom’s improvident decision had given the Republican party compelling images around 
which to rally its base.138
2005) (noting “legal recognition became a major issue”). 
135 See Rosen, supra note 17, at 48 (noting that the marriage amendment has potential to 
“provoke a mini-culture war in each of the 50 state legislatures”).
136 In 2004, 15 state constitutional amendments were ratified.  WIKIPEDIA, supra note 
134.  Some of the amendments not only prohibited marriage, but also any parallel status that 
would grant “the incidents of marriage.” Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Marriage-
Related State Constitutional Amendments, available at 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&CONTENTID=21264&TEMPLATE=/Conte
ntManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm  (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).  As of September 2005, the 
Human Rights Campaign reports that one additional state had amended its constitution and 
amendments were pending in 13 more states.  Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Proposed 
State Constitutional Amendments, available at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Center&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDis
play.cfm&ContentID=26900 (last visited September 2, 2005).  A total of 18 states have passed 
state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage.  AP, Psychiatrists May Make Stand 
for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, MAY 23, 2005, at A15.
137
 In 2004 the Federal Marriage Amendment was considered in both the U.S. House and 
Senate where it failed to garner the required two-thirds majority to continue.  Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Same Sex Marriage Amendment Fails in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A14 
(noting vote was 227 to 186 in favor of the amendment, but short of the two-thirds majority 
needed).
138
  Dean E. Murphy, Some Democrats Blame One of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 5, 
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The events of 2004 followed a now familiar pattern in the longstanding struggle over the 
recognition of same-sex relationships.  A pro-marriage court ruling is challenged by the 
traditional values movement through the political process, which then sets in motion a flurry of 
prophylactic political measures in other jurisdictions.   Regional or local pro-recognition 
sentiments are overwhelmed by majoritarian bias when the issue is re-framed on a larger scale.  
The general pattern has taken a variety of forms.  For example, a municipal domestic partnership 
registry reflecting local pro-recognition views could be invalidated by a state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting not only same-sex marriage, but also any extension of “the incidents of 
marriage” to same-sex couples.139  Massachusetts same-sex marriages, imposed by court order,
could be invalidated by a pending Massachusetts state constitutional amendment or the FMA.140
To understand the dynamics of this strategic of institutional maneuvering, it is important 
to examine the process of goal articulation and the costs and benefits of participation.  As 
explained below, the demand for relationship recognition is driven by individuals in same-sex 
relationships who have very high stakes in the outcome.  These stakes can run from such 
mundane concerns as whether the local swim club will let a same-sex couple sign up for a 
2004, at A18 (quoting Sen. Diane Feinstein).
139
  For a discussion of a new generation of marriage laws which, in addition to banning 
same-sex marriage, prohibit the grant of the “incidents of marriage” see infra text accompanying 
notes 309-13. 
140
  Voters and legislators tried to circumvent the implementation of the Goodridge court 
order through appeal to the constitutional amendment process.  Pam Belluck, Massachusetts 
Plans to Revisit Amendment on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at A13.  However, 
this attempt was thwarted in Massachusetts due to a design feature of the state amendment 
process.  Id.  The Massachusetts Assembly passed a constitutional amendment barring same-sex
marriage, but voters will not be able to consider the amendment until 2006.  Id.
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“family” membership141 to issues involving fundamental questions of human dignity and bodily 
integrity, such as whether a surviving same-sex partner can control the disposition of her 
partner’s remains142 or sue on account of her partner’s wrongful death.143 In the case of the 
counter-demand from the traditional values movement, the benefits of participation are more 
diffuse and less immediate.144
A.  The Demand for Recognition
The demand for the recognition of same-sex relationships began as a natural extension of 
the broader goals of equality and individual freedom espoused by the LGBT movement.145
141 See Marcia Chambers, At Country Clubs, Gay Members Ask for Privileges for their 
Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at D1 (describing efforts to win relationship recognition). 
142
 Same-sex couples can draft documents which try to anticipate such circumstances, but 
the extent to which the documents can legally bind third parties such as funeral directors or 
cemeteries is uncertain, except where such documents are expressly authorized by law.  For 
example, Virginia expressly authorizes the designation of an individual who Ashall make 
arrangements for [the declarant=s] burial or the disposition of [the declarant=s] remains, including 
cremation, upon [the declarant=s] death.@ VA. CODE ANN. ' 54.1-2825 (2001).   For the particular 
problems facing surviving same-sex partners see Jennifer E. Horan, Note, “When Sleep at Last 
has Come”: Controlling the Disposition of Dead Bodies for Same-Sex Couples, 2 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 423 (1999) (discussing difficulty encountered by surviving same-sex partners).
143
 Standing to sue for wrongful death is established by statute.  See John G. Culhane, A 
“Clanging Silence”: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911, 953-54 (describing 
origin of wrongful death actions).  The order of priority starts with the surviving spouse and 
continues through the next of kin.  Id.  Only a handful of states include surviving same-sex 
partners as spousal equivalents for wrongful death purposes.
144
 For a discussion of the distribution of stakes in the traditional values movement see 
infra text accompanying notes 174-95 (discussing diffuse stakes).
145 The gay rights movement originally espoused a liberationist philosophy based on 
principles of individual autonomy and freedom.  See generally, CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 29-
31 (discussing gay liberation movement).  Gay liberationists pursued a path of revolutionary 
social and political change, but it was short-lived, spanning from the 1969 Stonewall riots until 
the mid- 1970s.  See JAGOSE, supra note 18, at 30-43 (describing liberationist strategy.  The 
emphasis the gay liberationists placed on personal autonomy gave way to equality demands that 
have dominated since the 1980s. Id.
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Tracing its inception to the Stonewall Riots of 1969,146 the contemporary LGBT movement is 
represented by a sophisticated array of advocacy organizations, including legal advocacy groups, 
media watchdogs, federal, state, and local lobbying efforts, and networks of educators, religious 
organizations, and special interest groups.147  With its ultimate goal being the normalization of 
homosexuality, the LGBT movement has lobbied for anti- discrimination measures,148 positive 
portrayals of homosexuals by the media,149 and the repeal of sodomy laws.150 In recent years, 
there has emerged a movement within a movement dedicated to the singular goal of equal 
relationship rights for same-sex couples.151  Increasingly, this goal has been defined as equal 
146 Id.  On June 27, 1969, after a memorial service following the death of Judy Garland at 
the Stonewall Inn, police in New York City raided the gay and drag bar, and the resistance that 
followed has been established as marking the initiation of a social movement dedicated to 
seeking recognition and acceptance of same-sex relationships.  Id.
147 See Chauncey, supra note 96, at 5 (noting “profound change” in “the place of lesbians 
and gay men in American society”).
148
  Only 16 states and the District of Columbia have legislation that prohibits 
discrimination on account of sexual orientation.  Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Anti-
Discrimination Laws & Policies, at http://www.hrc.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).  The 16 
states are: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, Hawaii, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin.  Id.
149
  For example, the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation was founded in 1985.  
GLAAD, Our History, supra note 38.  It was modeled the B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League. 
CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 32. GLAAD is now a national organization dedicated to 
“promoting and ensuring fair, accurate and inclusive representation of people and events in the
media as a means of eliminating homophobia and discrimination based on gender identity and 
sexual orientation.” GLAAD, supra note 38. Chauncey notes that the efforts of GLAAD 
“prompted soul-searching and debate in many of the nation’s newsrooms”).  CHAUNCEY, supra 
note 96 at 44.
150
  By the time Lawrence was decided in 2003, only 13 states had sodomy laws.  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 573 (2003).  This was down from 24 states and the District of 
Columbia when Bowers v. Hardwick was decided in 1986.  Id. at 572.  All states had sodomy 
laws until Illinois adopted the Uniform Penal Code in 1961 and as a result repealed its sodomy 
law.  Id. 
151 See generally CHAUNCEY, supra note 96 (discussing historical roots of demand for 
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marriage rights.152
The focus on marriage is understandable given the recent high profile case in 
Massachusetts and the fact that opposite-sex secular marriage is commonly used as a touchstone 
against which to measure the disabilities imposed on same-sex couples.153 Once marriage is 
established as the benchmark for the desired quantum of rights and responsibilities, anything 
short of marriage smacks of inequality. This notwithstanding, same-sex couples have pursued 
recognition of their relationships in a variety of ways and in a variety of institutional settings.  
The greatest gains toward relationship recognition have been made in these margins, as same-sex 
partners establish standing and visibility often one employer or one case at a time.
From a pragmatic standpoint, the possibility of same-sex marriage seemed very remote
when demands for domestic partnership benefits were first made in the 1980s.154  The question of 
equal marriage rights).  See also, MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, 
POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE  87 (1999) (noting “[m]arriage became the dominant 
issue in lesbian and gay politics in the late 1990s, but not before”).
152
 The momentum for equal marriage rights increased greatly after the Goodridge 
decision.  However, the resounding defeat in terms of both the Presidential election and the state 
constitutional amendments has led many within the LGBT movement to question the wisdom of 
focusing on marriage rights instead of a more moderate demand for relationship recognition.  
John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 
(reporting HRC leadership has concluded that “aggressively pursuing marriage played into the 
hands of Republicans and religious conservatives”).
153 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
limiting access to protections and benefits of civil marriage violates state constitution).
154
 From the perspective of the 1980s, the most successful LGBT litigation to date had 
concerned the associational freedoms and the right to organize LGBT student groups on college 
campuses.  See Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.C.Ga. 1972); Gay Students Organization 
of University of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Gay Alliance of 
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 
848 (1977) cert. den’d , 434 U.S. 1080, (1978); The Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin 
Peay University, 477 F.Supp 1267 (1979); Gay Students Serv. v. Texas A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 
1317 (5th Cir. 1984) cert. den’d  471 U.S. 1120 (1985).  In each case, the courts affirmed the 
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whether marriage was an appropriate goal for a movement dedicated to progressive social change
was the subject of considerable internal dispute.155 Rather than make an impulsive dash for 
marriage as had the early gay liberationists, advocates pursued a broad-based multi-institutional 
program, including employee benefits for domestic partners and other private contractual 
arrangements in the market,156 dialogue with progressive religious denominations,157 and
municipal domestic partner registries.158  In addition, advocates constructed a long-term plan to 
secure constitutionally mandated equal marriage rights through the state courts.159
Often, however, the demand for relationship recognition has not been the result of a
carefully orchestrated design for social change.  Instead, it arose from an individual tragedy 
visited upon a particular couple.  For example, when the emergency room staff at the University 
of Maryland Medical System refused to allow Bill Flanigan to see his dying partner, he 
students’ associational freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment.  These politically 
themed cases were a far cry from marriage.  Moreover, the resistance the early LGBT student 
groups faced was emblematic of the then-prevalent negative views of homosexuality.   According 
to a 1982 Gallup poll, only 34% of the respondents thought that same-sex behavior was 
“acceptable.”  Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, supra note 39.
155
 Progressive voices within the LGBT movement have questioned whether the emphasis 
placed on traditional “marriage” compromises the potentially transformative power of the 
movement.  See e.g., Paula Ettlebrick, supra note 99 (questioning marriage as a goal).  The 
perspective offered by Queer Theory has also offered a sustained and nuanced critique of the goal 
of same-sex marriage.  See e.g., WARNER, supra note 151, at 87-95 (arguing same-sex marriage 
is inconsistent with tradition of queer thought). 
156
  Writing in 1996, Urvashi Vaid, the former executive director of the National Lesbian 
and Gay Task Force, concluded that “[s]ome of the biggest successes in the gay rights movement 
came in the 1990s through changes in corporate policies that covered thousands of employees.”  
URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY 10 (1996).
157 See CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 37 (discussing “debate in the churches over the 
place of lesbians and gay men in religious life”)
158 For example, West Hollywood California became the first municipality to establish a 
domestic partnership registry.  Equality California, AB205 Fact Sheet, available at 
http://eqca.org (last visited Aug.29, 2005). 
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demanded to be recognized as “family.”160  Sherry Barone demanded recognition as the executor 
of her partner’s will when the cemetery where her partner was buried refused to permit the term 
“beloved life partner” to be inscribed on the grave marker.161  Frank Vasquez demanded to be 
recognized as something more than a “roommate” when the family of his deceased partner tried 
to evict Vasquez from the home he and his partner had shared for 27 years.162 As these cases 
159
  Garrow, supra note 100 (describing evolution of marriage litigation strategy).
160
   The hospital did not allow Flanigan to see his dying partner until the partner’s mother 
arrived and authorized the visit.  Flangian v. University of Maryland Medical Center, Lambda 
Legal’s Complaint, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/cases/brief.html?record=1012http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/cases/record?record=174 (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).  The hospital denied Flanigan the 
right to see his partner even though his partner had executed a health care power of attorney in 
Flanigan’s favor and the couple had registered as domestic partners in San Francisco.  Id.   By the 
time Flanigan was permitted to see his partner, he was unconscious and life-sustaining treatment 
had been administered contrary to his express wishes.  Id.  Flanigan later sued the hospital for 
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.  The jury found for the hospital.  
Lambda Legal, Flanigan v. University of Maryland Medical System, at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=174 (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
161
 When Sherry Barone=s partner of thirteen years, Cynthia Friedman, died at age 35, she 
left a will which appointed Barone as executor. Debbie Woodell, Gay Partner Battles for Rights 
Even at the Grave, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 31, 1997, at C8.  The will expressly 
authorized Barone to Aarrange for the disposition@ of Friedman=s remains.  Murray Dubin, Late 
Woman's Parents, 'Life Partner' Wage Legal Battle Over Headstone Inscription, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, June 30, 1997.  The cemetery where Friedman was buried refused to inscribe her 
headstone with the epitaph directed by Barone  C “beloved life partner, daughter, granddaughter, 
sister and aunt”  C because Friedman=s parents objected to the use of the term Abeloved life 
partner.@  Claudia N. Ginanni, Cemetery To Inscribe Headstone, Pay $ 15,000, THE LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 8, 1997, at 5.  The parents demanded a slightly different ordering of 
Friedman=s filial ties: Aour beloved daughter, sister, granddaughter, and loving friend.”  Dubin, 
supra.  Shortly before the third anniversary of Friedman=s death, the cemetery acceded to 
Barone=s wishes as part of a settlement agreement reached in the federal lawsuit Barone brought 
against the cemetery.  Ginanni, supra. 
162
 Frank Vasquez=s partner of 27 years, Robert Schwerzler, died without a will.  Marsha 
King, Should Companion Get Deceased=s Estate? SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1.  
Vasquez and Schwerzler ran a burlap bag recycling business in Puyallup, Washington where they 
shared a modest three-bedroom house.  Id.  When Schwerzler died intestate at the age of 78, 
Vasquez quickly learned that the entire $230,000 estate was titled solely in Schwerzler=s name.  
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illustrate, the movement for relationship recognition is not driven by abstract considerations of 
equality, but by a very real vulnerability that confronts every person in a same-sex relationship: 
your same-sex partner is a legal stranger.163  She is not considered family regardless of the length 
or quality of your relationship.164
In the United States, the status of same-sex relationships varies wildly from jurisdiction to 
Id.  Schwerzler=s siblings asserted their rights to Schwerzler=s property as next of kin and, 
according to Vasquez=s lawyer, Aliterally wanted to put Mr. Vasquez out on the street with 
nothing.@  Sam Skolnik, Same-Sex Estate Rights Backed; State High Court Says Gays May Be 
Entitled to Partners' Property in Absence of a Will, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 2, 2001, 
at B1.  Although not required to legally, the siblings justified their claim to Schwerzler=s estate, 
including the home he had shared with Vasquez, on the basis that the two men were not 
homosexual.  Id.  See also, King, supra. (quoting Schwerzler=s brother A[c]ertainly, there was 
nothing being done in public@).  In the eyes of Schwerzler=s family Vasquez was really more like 
a housekeeper or a boarder who just happened to stay for 27 years.  Id. (stating that Vasquez Awas 
a boarder or friend, nothing more than that[]@).
Ultimately, the Washington Supreme Court recognized an equitable claim brought by 
Vasquez against his partner=s estate.  Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735 (2001).  The court 
extended to same-sex couples an established equitable doctrine that allows an unmarried 
opposite-sex partner who relied on the decedent to execute the necessary documents to secure the 
survivor=s property interests to maintain an action against the estate that is somewhat akin to the 
doctrine of equitable adoption. Id
163
  This raises a very important point of reference.  Surviving same-sex partners are not 
simply unequal to surviving spouses.  In the absence of some form of state-wide relationship 
recognition, same-sex partners are no relation to the decedent, standing behind siblings, cousins, 
and the state in terms of priority.  Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11Attacks and Surviving 
Same-Sex Partners: Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 31, 41 (2202). 
164
 The disabilities that flow from this lack of status are too numerous to catalogue here. 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s exposed some of the most wrenching of these disabilities 
as a generation of young men faced a premature death and their partners were denied access to 
hospital rooms and rendered invisible in the face of often estranged and disapproving parents.  
See CHAUNCEY, supra note 56, at 95-104 (discussing role of HIV/AIDS epidemic in creating 
demand for same-sex marriage).  In the 1990s, the highly publicized case of Sharon Kowalski 
who suffered a brain injury in a car accident and whose parents refused to allow her to see her 
partner, inspired a public education campaign to induce same-sex couples to write wills and sign 
health care powers of attorney.  See id. at 111-15 (discussing emphasis on documents and role in 
forming demand for same-sex marriage).  As is evident from the Flanigan and Barone cases, 
private documents are not sufficient to make a same-sex partner the equivalent of family.  See 
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jurisdiction and whether a same-sex partner will be considered a legal stranger, a spouse, or 
something in between, depends on where the couple lives and works.165 When a couple who 
enjoys some form of recognition where they live decides to travel, they do so at their own risk,
since very few forms of relationship recognition are portable.166 Both the American Psychiatric 
Association and the American Psychological Association have come out in support of equal 
marriage rights, citing the psychological toll caused by this uncertainty.167  The problems caused 
by the lack of uniform relationship recognition are compounded when a same-sex couple is 
raising children and second-parent adoption is not available.168
supra notes 161 and 162.
165
  This is a function of the competence of the recognizing jurisdiction. See infra text 
accompanying notes 200-27 (discussing element of competence).
166
  The fragility of local grants of recognition was obvious when the University of 
Maryland Medical System rejected Flanigan’s claim that his status as a registered domestic 
partner pursuant to a San Francisco ordinance made him “family” for purposes of the hospital’s 
visitation policy.  See supra note 160 (describing Flanigan’s ordeal and suit against hospital).
167
 In 2004, the American Psychological Association (APA) adopted a Resolution in favor 
of same-sex marriage.  American Psychological Association, Resolution on Sexual Orientation 
and Marriage, July, 2004, available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/marriage.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2005). The APA Resolution supports equal marriage rights, noting “the minority 
stress” suffered by same-sex couples due to lack of legal recognition and the fact that a parallel or 
partial status such as a registered domestic partner is “rarely portable.”  Id. at 3.  In 2005, the 
American Psychiatric Association followed suit with a similar resolution.  AP, Top Psychiatric 
Group Urges Making Gay Marriage Legal, WASH. POST,  May 23, 2005, at 0A2; American 
Psychiatric Association, Same Sex Marriage Resource Document, available at 
http://www.psych.org/public_info/libr_publ/resource.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005). 
168
  According to the 2000 Census, 34 percent of female same-sex couples and 22 percent 
of male same-sex couples have at least one child under 18 living in the home.  National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force, Parenting, at http://www.thetaskforce.org/theissues/issue.cfm?issueID=30
(last visited Aug. 29, 2005). One of the major questions for same-sex parents is whether a 
second-parent adoption will be recognized in a state that does not allow such adoptions.  For 
example, Oklahoma recently enacted a statute that prohibits the recognition of an adoption by 
more than one individual of the same sex.  10 OK. ST. ANN. s. 7502-1.4 (2004).  This raises the 
disturbing possibility that a non-biological child who is jointly adopted by a same-sex couple 
would be considered an orphan if taken into the jurisdiction of Oklahoma.  For an overview of 
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At base, the movement for the recognition of same-sex relationships is driven by high 
stakes individuals who have a strong desire to protect their chosen family. Beyond these high 
stakes individuals, the movement for relationship recognition has attempted to build alliances 
with other marginalized groups and combat what was once a pervasive negative view of same-
sex relationships.169 For example, as recently as 1987, 78% of the U.S. population reported that 
same-sex relationships were always wrong.170 With that level of disapproval, local or regional 
gains could easily be overturned through majoritarian action, regardless of whether the gain was 
secured in the market, the courts or the political process.  Faced with extraordinarily high 
information costs, the LGBT movement had to work to change the perception of homosexuality 
or risk losing any gains to periodic expressions of majoritarian bias.171 Although views regarding 
homosexuality, including workplace protection from discrimination, have changed drastically 
over the last two decades,172 the 2004 referenda results strongly suggest that the traditional values 
the laws governing second-parent adoptions see National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Second 
Parent Adoptions in the U.S. as of January 2005, available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/secongparentadoptionmap.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 
2005).
169
 For example, the mission statement of Marriage Equality USA, a national organization 
dedicated to securing equal marriage rights, lists three core activities: education, media outreach, 
and forming partnerships and alliances with “gay and non-gay” organizations.  Marriage 
Equality, About Marriage Equality, at http://www.marriageequality.org/about_us.htm (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2005). 
170 CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 43 (reporting polling data).
171
  The available stock of negative stereotypes regarding homosexuality greatly increased 
the information costs for the LGBT movement.  Chauncey notes that “[t]hose demonic [anti-gay] 
stereotypes became less effective as people became more familiar with gay people, as their 
friends and relatives came out to them and as they saw gay people treated in more humane and 
respectful ways in the media.”  Id. at 151.
172 See supra note 39 (discussing current poll statistics showing 88% favor equal 
workplace treatment).  On the availability of stock symbols, Komesar notes: 
The degree to which someone understands any issue also depends on that person’s 
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movement has successfully drawn the line at same-sex marriage – at least for now.173
B.  The Counter-Demand and the Traditional Values Movement.
The counterdemand for the non-recognition of same-sex relationships is part of the larger
traditional values movement that can be traced to the founding of politically active conservative 
evangelical organizations in the late 1970s, such as the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s influential 
Moral Majority.174  The traditional values movement considers homosexuality, along with 
abortion, no-fault divorce, and the separation of church and state, as symptomatic of a general 
decline in morals that threatens the health of the nation.175 In many ways, the traditional values 
movement mirrors the structure of the LGBT movement, complete with sophisticated advocacy 
groups, media watchdogs, and the like.176 In terms of homosexuality, the traditional values 
movement has recharacterized anti- discrimination laws as government-granted “special rights” 
stock or endowment of general information.  This stock is determined by cultural, 
formal education, and the coverage of the press and media.  Each culture has 
certain subjects such as religion or ethnicity that are part of the common 
experience of the members of that culture.  This stock of “simple symbols” 
provides certain issues with easy recognition.  Because the press and media 
provide cheap and accessible information, press and media response is a central 
element in determining the degree of majoritarian influence.
KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 63.
173
   This would be consistent with the national polling figures on the subject of 
relationship recognition, which lags behind equal workplace treatment.  See supra note 40 
(discussing polling data on attitudes toward same-sex marriage).
174 See CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 147-48 (discussing Moral Majority).
175 See HERMAN, supra note 11, at 195 (discussing traditional values movements in terms 
of its desired platform for social change).
176
  For example, the Family Research Council (FRC) is a full-service traditional values 
lobbying organization.  Family Research Council, Defending Faith, Family, and Freedom, at 
http://www.frc.org (last visited Aug. 2005).   Its numerous designated “policy areas” include such 
issues as: homosexuality, stem cell research, religious freedom, the “homosexual agenda in 
public education,” judicial activism, abortion, covenant marriage, and tax reform.  Family 
Research Council, Policy Areas, at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=RESEARCH (last visited Aug. 
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and led numerous successful state-wide referenda reversing pro-gay gains.177
After the 1993 decision of the Hawaii state supreme court in Baehr v. Lewin,178 the 
traditional values movement increasingly focused on one particular “special right,” namely same-
sex marriage.179  It characterizes the push for same-sex relationship recognition as an assault on 
traditional marriage that represents the next step on the ominous “gay agenda.”180  The traditional 
values movement correctly assumes that the limited g ains same-sex couples make in terms of 
relationship recognition have a cumulative effect.  Accordingly, it decries all actions that contain 
so much as a glimmer of recognition for same-sex relationships. For example, traditional values 
advocates have objected to providing domestic violence protections to victims of same-sex 
intimate battering on the grounds that it sets the stage for same-sex marriage.181  Similar 
objections were raised in connection with the September 11 relief efforts when the Reverend Lou
Sheldon, chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition, denounced the American Red Cross for 
providing emergency assistance to surviving same-sex partners.182
29, 2005).
177
  For a discussion of the rise of the referendum campaigns see CHAUNCEY, supra note 
96, at 45-46.  For a discussion of the “special rights” campaign see id. at 46-47.
178
 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  See Rosen, supra note 17 (describing 
citizen’s initiative to amend Hawaii’s constitution).
179
  Chauncey notes that “‘defending marriage’ as the union of one man and one woman 
had special symbolic significance for the opponents of gay rights.”  CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 
145.  The traditional values movement considers same-sex marriage “both the ultimate sign of 
gay equality and the final blow to their traditional ideal of marriage[.]”  Id.
180
  The Gay Agenda is the title of an anti-gay documentary produced during the 
Amendment 2 battle in Colorado that culminated in Romer v. Evans.  Id. 
181
  Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While 
Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325, 338-39 (1999).
182 See Am. Red Cross, Guidelines on the Definition of Family for Red Cross Assistance 
and the Family Gift Program, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-
data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/50.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).  Reverend Lou Sheldon, chairman 
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The traditional values movement typically does not have standing to challenge the 
individual unscripted victories that occur from time to time when same-sex partners demand 
recognition in the courts, such as when the California Supreme Court allowed Sharon Smith to 
bring a wrongful death action against the owners of the two dogs that had mauled her partner to 
death in the hallway outside their apartment.183  In these individual cases, the traditional values 
movement is consigned to comment from the sidelines, occasionally making an appearance as 
amici.184 The same is true when employees demand domestic partner benefits.  Except in the 
of the Traditional Values Coalition, denounced attempts to secure recognition for surviving 
same-sex partners as an attempt on the part of pro-gay advocacy organizations to use a “‘national 
tragedy to promote their agenda.’”  Thomas B. Edsall, Minister Says Gays Should Not Get Aid, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at A22.  Sheldon argued that relief should be awarded “‘on the basis 
and priority of one man and one woman in a marital relationship.’”  Id.
183
  Peter Hartlaub, Same-Sex Partner Can Sue for Damages; Wrongful-Death Claim in 
Dog-Mauling Case, S.F. CHRON., July 28, 2001, at A1.  Diane Whipple, a 33 year old lacrosse 
coach, was mauled to death by her neighbors= two large dogs in the hallway outside the door to 
the apartment that she shared with her partner of seven years, Sharon Smith, on January 26, 2001. 
 Christopher Heredia, Dog Mauling Victim=s Partner to Test Wrongful Death Law, S.F. CHRON., 
Feb. 19, 2001, at A13.  The details of Whipple=s attack were widely reported in the press and 
generated considerable sympathy for her surviving partner and hostility toward the owners of the 
dogs.  Bill Hewitt, Frances Dinkelspiel & Rebecca Paley, Unleashed Fury; A Dog Attack in San 
Francisco Kills a Beloved Lacrosse Coach and Stirs Outrage Coast to Coast, PEOPLE, Feb. 19, 
2001, at 117.  In the face of clear statutory language to the contrary, Smith pursued her wrongful 
death action against the owners arguing that the exclusion of same-sex partners was invalid under 
the California state constitution and met with unexpected success at the trial court level.  Peter 
Hartlaub, Same-Sex Partner Can Sue for Damages, S.F. CHRON., July 28, 2001, at A1.  See also, 
Heredia, supra (noting that Ano case like Smith=s has ever been successful@).  Whipple=s mother 
also filed a wrongful death suit in case Smith=s was dismissed, with the intent that the two suits 
be merged.  Jaxon Van Derbeken ,  Dog-Mauling Case Settled: Victim’s Mom, Partner Sued 
Landlords, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2002, at A31.  
184
 In their capacity as amici, traditional values organizations will often raise issues that 
are too controversial to find their way into the actual pleadings.  For example, in Lawrence v. 
Texas, a variety of traditional values amici argued that public health and safety – not simply 
morals – justified the criminalization of same-sex sodomy.  For example, an amicus brief filed by 
Texas legislators argued that the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law was rationally related to 
protecting public health.  Brief of Amici Curiae Texas Legislators at 15, Lawrence, (No. 02-102). 
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case of public employers, aggrieved members of the traditional values movement have no 
standing to challenge the grant of benefits.  
The lack of standing to challenge individual cases underscores a puzzling feature of the 
traditional values movement.  Unlike same-sex couples who have an obvious personal stake in 
the debate, it is not clear what motivates the core participants in the traditional value movement.  
It is one thing for an individual to work toward formal and social recognition of her family, but it 
is quite a different thing to work toward the erasure of a stranger’s family.185 Therefore, as a 
practical matter, it makes sense that the movement concentrates its efforts on legislative action or 
constitutional amendments that can undo or forestall the individual court victory or grant of 
 The legislators argued, inter alia., that “[s]ame-sex sodomy presents serious health problems 
that must be prevented in order to ensure that all of the people of the state of Texas, especially 
those that seek to engage in same-sex sodomy, are fully protected from the ravages of infection 
and disease.”  Id. at 17.  The Texas Physicians’ Resource Council argued specifically that “same-
sex sodomy is more harmful to the public health than . . . opposite sex-sodomy” and noted that 
“[t]he extent of STDs associated with same-sex sodomy is likely related to the high frequency of 
sex, anonymous or multiple sex partners, and other high-risk behaviors.”  Brief of Amici Curiae 
Texas Physicians’ Resource Council et al. at 20-21, Lawrence, (No. 02-102).
In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, the Boy Scouts successfully argued that the New Jersey 
anti-discrimination law infringed upon the group’s associational freedom by requiring it to 
reinstate an openly gay assistant scoutmaster.  Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. 
Super Ct. 1998).  An amicus brief filed by the Family Research Council, a traditional values 
organization with a particular focus on homosexuality, argued that male homosexuals should not 
be scoutmasters because of their tendency toward pedophilia.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Family 
Research Council at 22, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)(No. 99-699).  In a 
thirty page brief, the organization managed to use the term pedophile or some derivation thereof 
thirty-one times.  Knauer, supra note 38, at 63.
185
  In response to claims by then-Representative Henry Hyde that same-sex marriage 
“demean” or “trivialize” marriage, Michael Warner asserts: “He doesn’t just want his marriage to 
be holy; he wants us to be holy at the expense of someone else’s.  To see gay marriage as 
“demeaning” is, in his view, a way of seeing “traditional marriage” as more significant.”  
WARNER, supra note 80, at 82.  Warner explains that “same-sex marriage provokes such 
powerful outbursts of homophobic feeling in many straight people . . . [because] [t]hey want 
marriage to remain a privilege, a mark that they are special.”  Id.
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benefits.  Locating its demand in the political process or direct democracy may be necessary 
because the benefits of participation are arguably so diffuse, and success depends on reaching the 
broadest possible base.
The vocabulary of the traditional values movement expresses the motivation in terms of a 
threat that is no less real or immediate than that encountered by Bill Franklin or Sharon Barone 
or Frank Vasquez.  According to the traditional values movement, “Defense of Marriage” acts 
are necessary to secure traditional marriage and safeguard it from homosexual encroachment and 
degradation.186 Senator Rick Santorum, in his impassioned statement on the floor of the Senate 
in support of the FMA, argued that stopping same-sex marriage was a matter of Athe ultimate 
homeland security.”187 Beyond the immediate desire to protect marriage, there is the larger goal 
to eradicate or control homosexuality, which is seen as an unhealthy, immoral, and chosen 
lifestyle.188  Working with this larger goal as its platform, the traditional values movement 
186
 For a discussion of what exactly the Defense of Marriage Act is trying to defend see 
CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 144-55. 
187 150 CONG. REC. S 8061, S8075 (daily ed. July 14. 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum). Senator Santorum was responding, in part, to Democratic claims that Congress had 
more important things to consider.  The full statement also included an appeal to consider the 
best interests of the children: 
I would argue, the future of our country hangs in the balance because the future of 
the American family hangs in the balance. What we are about today is to try to 
protect something that civilizations for 5,000 years have understood to be the 
public good. It is a good not just for the men and women involved in the 
relationship and the forming of that union, which is certainly a positive thing for 
both men and women, . . . but even more important to provide moms and dads for 
the next generation of our children. Isn't that important? Isn't that the ultimate
homeland security, standing up and defending marriage, defending the right for 
children to have moms and dads, to be raised in a nurturing and loving 
environment? That is what this debate is all about.
Id.
188 See, Knauer, supra note 38, at 46-50 (describing traditional values movement’s 
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believes that any recognition of same-sex relationships to encourages homosexuality and 
abandons the individuals who are trapped in the unhealthy and immoral lifestyle.189  Thus, the 
traditional values movement is decidedly other-regarding, expressing, in a very literal way, its 
evangelical roots.
When the traditional values movement denounces same-sex marriage, it demonizes 
homosexuality while at the same time exalting opposite-sex “one-flesh” unions.190 At its 
inception, the movement could easily draw on the existing stock of stereotypical opinions 
regarding homosexuality and pervasive disapproval, thereby greatly reducing information 
costs. 191 As the public understanding of homosexuality gradually changed, however, the 
traditional values movement has had to incur increasing costs by continuing to champion an 
outdated view originally popularized by the American Freudians where homosexuality is a 
diseased condition, susceptible to therapeutic intervention.192
Increasingly, the traditional values movement has attempted to distance itself from its 
views regarding homosexuality and characterize the battle over same-sex marriage as a question 
construction of homosexuality).
189 See Id. at 46-47 (discussing ex-gays).
190
   Robert P. George, What’s Sex Got to do With It? Marriage, Morality, and 
Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 73-77 (2004) (explaining natural law concept of “marriage as 
one-flesh unity”).
191 See supra notes 171 and 172 (discussing easily available stock of negative 
stereotypes regarding homosexuality).   
192
 A 1982 Gallup poll revealed that only 34 percent of the respondents considered 
homosexuality to be an acceptable “lifestyle.”  See, Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, 
supra note 39 (reproducing Gallup results from 1982 through 2003).  By 2003, the number of 
respondents who believed that homosexuality was acceptable had risen to 54 percent.  Id.
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of institutional legitimacy.193 References to morality and the best interests of the children have 
taken second place to concerns about the balance of powers and democracy.194 According to the 
argument, important questions of moral and cultural significance are uniquely the province of the 
people to be determined by the precept of majority rule.  The “activist judge” has replaced the 
“homosexual activist” as the object for derision.195
IV.  THE ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
The on-going struggle over the recognition of same-sex relationships illustrates a hands-
on bottom-up approach to CIA that is an integral feature of any movement for the recognition of 
minority rights or social change.  Advocates seeking to secure recognition of same-sex 
relationships must evaluate the various institutional alternatives, such as the market, the courts, 
and the legislature, not simply with regard to their competency to grant the desired quantum of 
rights, but also in terms of the institutions= perceived responsiveness to demands for such rights
193
 For example, Senator Santorum argued that the FMA was necessary because courts 
“create rights and change the Constitution without having to go through this rather cumbersome 
process known as article V [the amendment process].”  150 CONG. REC. S 8061, S8074 (daily ed. 
July 14. 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum).  Senator Santorum warned that if Congress failed to 
act, “the courts  will go about the process, which they have been now for the past couple of 
decades, and simply change the Constitution without the public being heard.” Id. at S8075.  He 
concluded, “That is what this amendment is all about.”  Id.
194
 Santorum’s full statement represents a hybrid approach where claims of legitimacy are 
mixed with panic over children being raised by same-sex couples or otherwise influenced by 
homosexuals. 150 CONG. REC. S 8061 (daily ed. July 14. 2004) (statement of Sen. Santorum).  
195
  In 2005 the traditional values movement held two televised conferences called 
“Justice Sunday” to publicize its criticism of judicial activism and a judiciary that it views as 
hostile to religion.  David D. Kirkpatrick, Delay to Be on Christian Telecast on Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A14 (noting Representative Tom Delay, House majority leader agreed to 
participate).  The FRC website includes both “judicial activism” and “judicial reform” as “policy 
areas.” Family Research Council, Policy Areas, at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=RESEARCH
(last visited Aug. 29, 2005). 
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and resilience to anti-gay pressure.196 This strategic analysis does not produce a singular choice, 
but informs the movement’s allocation of resources among the various institutions.  
A multi-institutional approach is required because, despite the hopes of some legal 
scholars, there is no one single rescue institution “waiting in the wings” that can deliver the 
desired relief with one groundbreaking decision or comprehensive legislation package.197  A 
change in the law is not sufficient to effect social change.198 Moreover, a favorable change in 
any single institutional setting is potentially transitory in nature. If adequately mobilized, the 
atomistic forces that shape institutional behavior hold the ultimate majoritarian prerogative.  
Through the constitutional amendment process, they have the power to redraw the lines that 
define institutions.  Ultimately, they have the power to decide who decides.199
An understanding of the strategic nature of CIA can help explain what might appear at 
first glance to be puzzling choices or results, such as the decision of the LGBT movement to 
devote much time and resources to securing partial market-based rights.  This section discusses 
the three core components of strategic institutional choice and the use of extra-institutional 
responses to reverse of blunt gains made in other institutional settings. After addressing the 
196
   As noted earlier, this Essay focuses on the three core institutions: the market, the 
courts, and the legislature.  However, there are arguably a number of other relevant institutions, 
such as religion, the media, and communities.  Within the three core institutions presented for 
analysis, there is often an important demarcation between federal and state actors.  See supra 
notes 49 and 70 (discussing alternative institutional options).
197
 KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 24 (faulting the belief “that a perfect or idealized 
institution is waiting in the wings”).  See also ROSENBERG, supra note 25 (disputing ability of 
judiciary to effect meaningful social change).
198 See Martha Minow, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of 
Lawyers: Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 14-17 (2004) 
(discussing resistance to desegregation order by Brown v. Board of Education).
199
  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 162 (discussing importance of “who decides”).
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relative competence of each institution to grant the desired relief, it compares the responsiveness
and resilience of the market with that of the courts and the political system.  It also outlines the 
facility with which the traditional values movement has utilized extra-institutional responses to 
block relationship recognition on both the state and federal levels, particularly with its resort to 
direct democracy and the constitutional amendment process.
A.  Competency 
The market, the courts and the political process are each competent to provide some level 
of recognition to same-sex relationships.  Indeed, all institutions in society are probably 
competent to do so because the recognition of marriage as a privileged status is so pervasive.200
At the outset, it is important to make a distinction between relationship recognition and equal 
marriage rights.  Although the goal of the relationship recognition movement has been 
increasingly expressed as same-sex marriage, many important combinations of rights and 
responsibilities short of marriage are potentially available.201 The extension of these rights and 
imposition of these responsibilities sometimes occurs in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion; 
case by case, employer by employer.  Whereas these seemingly isolated flashes of recognition do 
not amount to marriage, they often make a significant difference in the lives of the individuals 
200
 On the federal level alone, there are an estimated 1,138 benefits attached to marriage. 
The Letter from Danya K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, United States General Accounting 
Office, to Honorable Bill Frist, Majority Leader, United States Senate (Jan. 23, 2004) available 
at  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
201
  The states that have adopted some form of relationship recognition each created a 
distinct parallel status typically designed to provide some, but not all, of the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage.  See infra text accompanying notes 245-58 (describing different 
parallel structures).  The Vermont structure of Civil Unions is an exception in that it provides 
identical benefits and responsibilities.  See infra note 212 (describing civil unions).
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involved.  They also have potential transformative value.  Each instance of recognition furthers 
the larger social goal of the normalization of homosexuality and provides precedent on which to 
base future decisions.202
Traditionally, marriage is thought to be a state law issue, along with questions of divorce, 
inheritance, adoption, and tort claims.203  However, the Defense of Marriage Act established a 
federal definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman.204  DOMA also purports 
to grant states the right to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages from sister states.205 Same-
sex marriages that are legally performed in Massachusetts are not respected at the federal level, 
202
  In decisions that provide some degree of relationship recognition, courts routinely 
point to the existence of domestic partnership policies.  See e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s 
Hospital, 196 Misc. 2d 440, 452 (N.Y. Misc. 2003) (supporting decision to recognize Vermont 
Civil Union for wrongful death purposes with notice of widespread domestic partner policies).  
203
  The traditional view is that family law is a state matter.  See e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (identifying family law as “an area that has long been regarded as a 
virtually exclusive province of the States”).  See contra Edward Stein, Past and Present 
Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 611, 619-23 (2004) (explaining traditional view that marriage is a state issue while outlining 
history of significant federal regulation).
204
  The Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was enacted in 1996 in response to 
the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 
1993).  DOMA adds a definition of “marriage” and “spouse” to Title 1 of the United States 
Code, also known as the Dictionary Act.  1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2004).  It provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or wife.
1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2004).
205
  DOMA purports to grant states the authority not to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in sister states.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2004).  For a discussion of the Full and Faith 
and Credit concerns raised by this provision see Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of 
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1996-1997).
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and it remains to be seen whether sister states will recognize the unions.206 As of January 2004, 
the United States General Accountability Office identified 1,138 federal statutory provisions 
under “which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and 
privileges.” 207 These include favorable joint tax rates,208 social security spousal benefits,209 and 
pension rights.210 Accordingly, the attainment of equal marriage rights would require action by 
the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress.
Although federal recognition has significant consequences, the issuance of marriage 
licenses is a state matter.  A state supreme court or legislature can authorize the issuance of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.211  In the alternative, a state legislature can choose to 
create a parallel status that grants all the rights of marriage, such as civil unions in Vermont.212
206
 A New York court recognized a Vermont civil union as the equivalent of marriage for 
purposes of the state wrongful death statute.  In Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, the court 
reasoned that Full Faith and Credit and equal protection considerations required it to treat a civil 
union in the same manner it would an out-of-state common law marriage. Langan v. St. 
Vincent’s Hospital, 196 Misc. 2d 440, 452 (N.Y. Misc. 2003).  Although the case represented the 
first time that a civil union had been recognized outside of Vermont, it was restricted to the 
discrete question of whether the decedent’s partner had standing to sue for wrongful death.  
There is also the issue of whether the same-sex marriages performed in Canada will be 
recognized.  See Michael Cooper, Hevesi Extends Pension Rights to Gay Spouses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 14, 2004, at B1 (reporting New York State pension fund would recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in Canada and thereby grant same-sex partners those rights otherwise 
reserved for spouses).
207 Letter from Danya K. Shah, supra note 200.
208
  26 U.S.C.A. § 1(a)(2) (2003).
209
 A surviving spouse qualifies for social security death benefits.  42 U.S.C.A. § 402 
(2004).  The surviving spouse of a deceased retired worker receives one hundred percent of the 
deceased spouse’s benefits.  42 U.S.C.A. § 402 (2003).
210
  The federal pension statute, ERISA, provides protection for a spouse’s interest in 
certain retirement funds.  See CHAUNCEY, supra note 75 (describing federal pension protections).
211
  To date, three state supreme courts have done so: Hawaii, Massachusetts, and 
Vermont.  See infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
212
  Vermont established civil unions under which parties to the union are granted “all the 
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Or, it can choose to create a partial status that carries some, but not all, of the rights and 
responsibilities of marriage, such as reciprocal beneficiaries in Hawaii.213 In any event, the
benefits extended will be limited in scope to those that the granting jurisdiction has to offer.  This 
question of portability remains an important aspect of competency because gains made on a state 
or local level are rarely transferable to another jurisdiction.214 For example, a state can permit a 
same-sex couple to file joint income tax returns for state purposes, but, in light of DOMA, a 
valid marriage license will not prompt the federal government to extend the same privilege.215
Finally, state courts and legislatures can provide specific relief to same-sex partners on a case-by-
same benefits, protections and responsibilities . . . .whether they derive from statute, 
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted 
to spouses in marriage.”  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1204(a) (2002).  This broad grant of rights 
includes equal status under the rules of intestate succession.  VT. STAT. ANN.  tit. 15, § 
1204(e)(3) (2004).  
213
 Hawaii established the category of “reciprocal beneficiary relationship” in order “to 
extend certain rights and benefits which [were] presently available only to married couples to 
couples composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying under state law.” 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (Michie 1999).  Individuals must sign a “declaration of 
reciprocal beneficiary relationship” in order to be eligible for certain benefits.  HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 572C-5 (Michie 1999).  A reciprocal beneficiary is afforded the same status as a spouse 
under the rules of intestate succession.  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102 (Michie 1999).
214
 Unlike the partial market-based benefits, the courts have the ability to order the 
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  With marriage would come the full panoply 
of rights and responsibilities available to married couples.  On the federal level, it remains to be 
seen whether Lawrence v. Texas will lead to the recognition of a fundamental right to marry a 
same-sex partner and the invalidation of DOMA, as well as the state constitutional amendments 
and state defense of marriage acts which restrict marriage to one man and one woman.  Justice 
Scalia seems to believe that this day has arrived, but marriage litigation at the federal level is not 
currently being pursued by any of the leading advocacy groups.  However, for many dedicated to 
the goal of equal marriage rights, the struggle for the recognition of same-sex relationships will 
not be over until the U.S. Supreme Court extends the holding of Loving v. Virginia to same-sex 
partners.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
215 See E.J. Graff, Marrying Outside the Box, N.Y. TIMES MAG., April 10, 2005, at 22 
(noting for first time individuals married under state law will be denied right to file as married 
for federal income tax purposes).
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case basis that is not part of an over-arching scheme of relationship recognition.216
On the local level, the scope of available benefits is even more limited.  By ordinance, a
municipality or county can establish the status of domestic partner and provide a registry system 
to formalize the relationship.217  The registry provides a governmental acknowledgement of the 
relationship, but the rights obtainable under these ordinances are necessarily limited to those 
rights that a municipality or county can grant.218 These could include the right to visit a same-sex 
partner incarcerated at a county prison, municipal tax benefits enjoyed by married couples, and 
the ability to transfer certain municipal licenses, such as a liquor license, to a same-sex partner.219
Within the market, the recognition of same-sex couples has come in the form of domestic 
partnership employee benefits and other instances where third-party service providers choose to 
treat same-sex couples the same as married couples.  The latter would include insurance 
companies that extend “married” rates to same-sex couples220 and country clubs that offer family 
216 See e.g., supra note 162 (discussing Vasquez’s equitable claim against his partner’s 
estate).
217
  The act of registration also provides evidence of the relationship if it were to be 
challenged in litigation.  This poses a potential trap for the unwary.  Because domestic registry 
provide little in the way of tangible benefits, it is reasonable that same-sex couples might not take 
the time to register.  However, the lack of registration – for admittedly meager benefits – could 
be used at a later date to undermine the existence of the relationship or its seriousness. 
218
  Such ordinances grant relative few benefits to non-municipal employees. Knauer, 
supra note 21, at 346-48.  However, the San Francisco domestic partnership ordinance goes one 
step further and requires all city contractors to offer domestic partnership benefits equal to those 
provided for spouses.  Myers v. City and County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 467-76 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (upholding ordinance).  In this way, the ordinance benefits a wider class of employees.
219
  The San Francisco Human Rights Commission website maintains a comprehensive 
list of all domestic partnership ordinances on the city and county level, including the 
requirements for registration and the rights conferred.  San Francisco Human Rights 
Commission, State Domestic Partnership Registries, available at 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights_page.asp?id=6283 (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
220
 Lambda Legal, Top Three Car Insurance Companies in New York Will Recognize Gay 
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memberships to same-sex couples.221  Private contract also can help order the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals in same-sex relationships with documents involving property 
distribution or substituted decision making.222
Market-based solutions are by their nature inadequate to provide wide-spread and 
comprehensive protection for same-sex relationships, in that employer-provided domestic 
partnership benefits extend only to a limited class of workers.223  However, workplace domestic 
partner benefits can be very valuable due to the structure of health care in the United States 
where health insurance is linked to employment.224 A married worker whose employment 
package includes health insurance can generally elect to cover her spouse and children, resulting 
Couples, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/press.html?record=1515 (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2005).
221
 In Koebke v. Bernandino Heights Country Club, the Supreme Court of California 
ruled that registered domestic partners were equivalent to married couples for purposes of 
discrimination laws applying to private businesses.  Koebke v. Bernandino Heights Country 
Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824 (2005).
222
 As noted earlier, however, private contract is not sufficient to provide surviving same-
sex partners with rights against third parties.  See supra note 142.  In particular, wills remain 
vulnerable to challenge by the next of kin, although the frequency with which next of kin actually 
contest wills which primarily benefit surviving same-sex partners is not clear nor is it easily 
susceptible to study.  See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the 
Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1075 (1999).
223
  The benefits are limited to the employees of the slightly over 8,000 employers who 
offer some level of domestic partner benefits and do not confer rights enforceable against third 
parties.  See infra note 268 (citing number and types of employers which offer domestic partner 
benefits).  It is likely further limited to the full-time employees of such employers, as part-time 
employees typically work without benefits.
224
 An estimated 45 million Americans do not have health insurance.  Robert Pear, Health 
Leaders Seek Consensus Over Uninsured, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at A1 (noting Census data 
estimating 45 million Americans are uninsured).  With 45 million uninsured individuals, 
employment that includes health benefits is very desirable.  Id.   High health care costs 
significantly increase the disparity between the compensation packages of married employees and 
employees in same-sex relationships without domestic partner benefits.
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in greater costs for the employer and an additional co-pay for the employee.225  In addition to 
health insurance benefits, employment packages often include a variety of spousal benefits, 
including bereavement or sick leave, tuition reimbursement, and retirement or pension 
benefits.226 Domestic partnership benefits extend these spousal benefits, or some subset of 
them, to same-sex partners.227
B. Responsiveness.
Beyond assessing the competency of an institution, strategic institutional choice must be 
predictive in nature.  Inquiring how responsive a given institution will be to a demand ensures 
that resources are not imprudently allocated to an ideal, but remote, institutional choice.228 This 
assessment involves issues of design, including structural roadblocks and susceptibility to 
majoritarian influence or bias.229 The institutional jockeying of the traditional values movement 
has produced a number of structural roadblocks that are specifically designed to inhibit an 
institution’s responsiveness to a demand for recognition of same-sex relationships. For 
example, the extent to which the courts in a given jurisdiction are receptive to demands for 
relationship recognition may depend on whether the jurisdiction has a state DOMA and/or a state 
225
 Employee benefits comprise an estimated 40 percent of a total compensation package.
 Human Rights Campaign, Why Employers Offer Domestic Partner Benefits, at 
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Work_Life/Get_Informed2/The_Issues/Why_Empl
oyers_Offer/Why_Employers_Offer.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
226
 For a comprehensive discussion of the different types of benefits offered and different 
types of domestic partner benefit programs see ACLU, Domestic Partnership, at
http://www.aclu.org/GetEqual/rela/domestic.html (last visited July 31, 2005).  
227 Id.
228
 An example of this would have been a decision to pursue marriage litigation in the 
1970s.  See supra note 98.  The result would have likely been an accumulation of bad precedent.
229
 KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 62-63 (describing two-force model of majoritarian and 
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constitutional amendment restricting marriage to one man and one woman.230 Forty-four states 
have either a state-wide DOMA or a state constitutional amendment restricting marriage.231
Many states have now have both.232 The number of states with these roadblocks illustrates that 
the goal of relationship recognition has not been able to command broad support, thereby making 
it particularly vulnerable to majoritarian influence or bias.233
In terms of responsiveness, the greatest gains have been made in the marketplace, on the 
regional and local level in the political process, and in individual court challenges asking for 
some form of partial and discrete recognition.234  Thus, there appears to be an inverse 
relationship between an institution’s responsiveness to demands for recognition and its 
competency to provide comprehensive relief; the least competent institutional settings are the 
minoritarian bias).
230 See Garrow, supra note 100 (describing strategy for marriage litigation).
231
 Forty-four states have defense of marriage acts that define marriage as the union 
between one man and one woman or state constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.  Human Rights Campaign Foundation, State- Wide Marriage Laws, available at 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=19449 (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).  All but three of these 
provisions were enacted in response to the marriage litigation of the 1990s.   Id.   In addition, 
California passed a law restricting marriage in 1977 and then passed a law in 2000 that refuses to 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions.  Id.
232 Id.
233
  These federal and state anti-marriage provisions were largely of academic interest 
because no state recognized same-sex marriage until the implementation of the Goodridge 
decision in June of 2004.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
However, the implementation of Goodridge and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas led to a renewed interest in anti-marriage legislation on both the federal and state level.  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In 2004, 25 state constitutional anti-marriage 
amendments were introduced, many of which purported to prohibit not only same-sex marriage, 
but also any parallel status that would grant “the incidents of marriage.” Human Rights 
Campaign Foundation, supra note 136.     
234
  This would be domestic partner employee benefits, municipal domestic partner 
registries, and cases such as the ones brought by Frank Vasquez and Sharon Smith.  See supra
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most responsive. Employer-provided domestic partnership benefits are now commonplace, but 
they remain a partial benefit reserved for a privileged few.235 Sixty-nine municipalities and 
counties have enacted some form of recognition for same-sex couples, but the recognition is 
largely symbolic.236  Courts have also recognized same-sex partners as family in very specific 
instances, such as protection from eviction under municipal rent control guidelines,237 standing to 
sue for wrongful death,238 and the right to take from a partner’s estate.239 However, these 
decisions are based on the notion of a “functional” family or equitable principles, not a 
declaration of equality for same-sex couples.240
notes 162 and 185 (discussing the Vasquez and Smith cases, respectively).
235 See infra text accompanying notes 257-69 (discussing prevalence of domestic partner 
benefits).
236 See supra note 218 (discussing quantum of benefits available under municipal 
ordinances).
237
  New York City rent control guidelines allowed a member of the decedent’s immediate 
family who shared the household to stay in a rent controlled apartment even where the family 
member was not a named party to the lease.  The ground-breaking 1989 case of Brashi v. Stahl 
Associates Co., extended this protection to a surviving same-sex partner through the adoption of 
a functional definition of family, with an emphasis on mutual interdependence.  Braschi v. Stahl, 
543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
238
  Standing to sue for wrongful death is established by statute.  See Culhane, supra note 
143 (describing origin of wrongful death actions).  The order of priority starts with the surviving 
spouse and continues through the next of kin.  Id.  Only a handful of states include surviving 
same-sex partners as spousal equivalents
239 See supra note 162 (discussing equitable claim brought by Frank Vasquez against his 
partner’s estate).
240
  In response to specific demands for recognition, courts in many states have expanded 
the notion of family to allow second-parent adoption and mandate visitation or shared custody for 
non-biological parents, expressing an element of pragmatism that acknowledges the changing 
face of the American family. See supra note 168 (discussing Census data regarding number of 
same-sex couples raising children).  Other courts have used equitable principles.  By and large, 
these decisions have not recognized same-sex partners qua spouses.  Some courts have 
interpreted anti-discrimination laws to compel employers to provide domestic partner benefits 
and private business to offer spousal rates to same-sex couples.  For example, the California 
Supreme Court recently ruled that ruled that registered domestic partners were equivalent the 
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With respect to the local and regional gains secured through the political process, one 
explanation for this success is that majoritarian forces are not sufficiently motivated to challenge 
these partial and piecemeal episodes of recognition.  The pro-recognition gains at issue are 
relatively modest or symbolic in nature and not portable.241  Arguably, these types of gains do not 
pose a direct “threat” to traditional marriage and, as a result, mobilization carries with it 
relatively low stakes and very diffuse benefits.  In such cases, the concentrated interests of a high 
stakes minority can easily overwhelm the slumbering majority.
As an alternative to this capture scenario, it is possible that relationship recognition can 
garner majority support among certain demographics.242  Thus, the explanation for the local and 
regional gains lies in the geographic outlines of the nation’s growing polarization on social 
issues, such as homosexuality.243 For example, public opinion polls show that 75% of the 
residents of the San Francisco Bay area favor same-sex marriage whereas that figure drops to 
49% when measured nationwide.244 The municipal ordinances might reflect a geographically
discrete pro-recognition majority that is lost once the frame is amplified to the state or national 
level.  Predictably, the traditional values movement excels at expanding the frame to secure the 
married couples for purposes of discrimination laws applying to private businesses.  Koebke v. 
Bernandino Heights Country Club, 36 Cal. 4th 824 (2005).  
241 See supra note 218 (discussing quantum of benefits conferred by municipal 
ordinances).
242
  This would represent a more nuanced polarization than suggested by the popular Red 
v. Blue states explanation.  See supra note 29 (explaining the Red and Blue state designations).  
As some commentators have suggested, there are often Blue urban areas surrounded by a big Red 
state.   See e.g., John Wildermuth, Red State, Blue State: California’s Political Map Reflects the 
Nation, S.F. CHRON.,  Nov. 7, 2004, at A1. 
243
  For a breakdown of views regarding relationship recognition on the basis of party 
affiliation, age, and region see WIKIPEDIA, supra note 134.
244 Same-Sex Marriage: Summary of Key Findings, ABC7news.com, at 
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broadest possible voter or constituent base.
On the state level, no legislature has authorized same-sex marriage.245  The legislatures of 
six states and the District of Columbia have granted some level of recognition to same-sex 
couples.  The jurisdictions represented are all decidedly in the “Blue-state” camp:246
California,247 Connecticut,248 District of Columbia,249 Hawaii,250 Maine,251 New Jersey,252 and 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=local&id=3306039 (last visited Aug. 27, 2005).
245
   A bill legalizing same-sex marriage was voted out of committee in the California 
legislature in 2005 and heard on the floor of the Senate.  Linda Gledhill, Same-Sex Marriage Bill 
Clears Committee, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2005, at B2.  [add result when it occurs]
246
  For a list of the “Blue” states see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_states.
247 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.50, 290, 298.5 (West 2004) (establishing procedure for 
“Registered domestic partners”).  Effective January 1, 2005, “registered domestic partners” enjoy 
substantially all the rights and responsibilities enjoyed by spouses under California law.  Assemb. 
B. 205, 1st Sess. (Cal. 2003-04).  Prior law had extended to “registered domestic partners” a 
number of rights traditionally reserved for spouses, including inheritance rights, certain health 
care decision-making authority, and standing to sue for wrongful death.  CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 
377.60 (2004).
248
  In 2005 Connecticut enacted civil union legislation.  2005 CT. ALS 3; 2005 CT. P.A.
3; 2005 CT. HB 7502 (2005).  The Connecticut law is modeled on Vermont’s civil union 
legislation and grants all the rights and responsibilities applicable to married couples.  Id. Unlike 
Vermont, Connecticut was not pressured to do so through litigation.  William Yardley,  
Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. TIMES,  April 21, at B5
249
  The District of Columbia provides a domestic partner registry.  D.C. CODE § 32-701, 
et seq.  The legislation provides domestic partner benefits for the employees of the District of 
Columbia.  D.C. CODE § 32-705.  It also provides limited benefits, such as the right of visitation 
in District hospitals.  D.C. § 32-704.  Congress blocked the implementation of the domestic 
partner provisions for nine years.  Adam Clymer, House Approves D.C.’s Law on Rights of 
Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A12.  
250 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2004).  Hawaii enacted legislation granting certain 
inheritance and other rights to “reciprocal beneficiaries.”  Id.
251
  In 2004, Maine enacted legislation establishing a state-wide domestic partner registry 
and extending to same-sex couples certain health-care decision-making authority and inheritance 
rights equivalent to spouses. 22 M.R.S. § 2710(2005).
252
 New Jersey’s newly enacted status of “domestic partners” extends certain medical 
decision-making authority to same-sex partners, as well as certain insurance and state tax 
benefits.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1 to 8A-11 (2004).
62
Vermont.253 In some of these instances, the legislation was the product of pending litigation or, 
in the case of Vermont, an express court order.254   The state-wide legislation varies with respect 
to the scope of the rights granted.  Civil Union status in Vermont carries with it all of the benefits 
and responsibilities of marriage.255  The California domestic partnership law extends a 
substantial number of rights that are commonly associated with marriage to registered domestic 
partners,256 as does Connecticut’s newly enacted domestic partnership law.257  On the other end 
of the spectrum, the New Jersey domestic partnership law grants registered domestic partners 
certain decision making authority and state tax benefits, but little in the way of substantive 
property rights.258
If the failure to secure gains through the political process is due to majoritarian bias, then 
the presumed top-down nature of courts should predict that the courts would be more responsive 
to demands for minority recognition than the political process.  However, both the courts and the 
legislature have been reluctant to grant broad-based recognition.  The Supreme Courts of only 
three states, Hawaii,259 Vermont,260 and Massachusetts,261 have held that the denial of marriage 
253 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2004).  Vermont established same-sex civil 
unions.  Id.  The parallel status extends to same-sex couples who enter into civil unions the 
benefits and responsibilities equivalent to spouses.  Id.
254 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
255 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2004).  
256 CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.50, 290, 298.5 (West 2004) (establishing procedure for 
“Registered domestic partners”).  See also CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377.60 (2004) (inheritance 
and wrongful death).
257 2005 CT. ALS 3; 2005 CT. P.A. 3; 2005 CT. HB 7502 (2005).
258 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1 to 8A-11 (2004).
259
  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  
260 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
261 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
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licenses to same-sex couples violates their state constitutions.262  As explained more fully in the 
following section, only the Massachusetts decision was implemented.  
One possible explanation for this lackluster response is that in this particular struggle the 
courts involved are for the most part state courts where the majority of judges are elected and, 
therefore, are perhaps more susceptible to the types of majoritarian or minoritarian bias that 
plague the political process than the federal judiciary.263  Unlike federal judges who serve with 
Article III lifetime tenure, 87% of all state judges are elected, including the supreme court 
justices of 38 states.264 Although state court judges typically serve longer terms than 
legislators,265 the fact that many state judges remain responsible to local voters might explain 
certain jurisdictional differences.266
262
  The cases have all been decided on state constitutional grounds, thereby making them 
not appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court.
263
  In part, the emphasis on state courts and state constitutions represents the lingering 
effect of Bowers v. Hardwick.  Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S.186 (1986).  It also represents the 
continuing effect of DOMA.  Writing for the majority in Bowers, Justice White stated 
unequivocally, that “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand 
and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.”  Bowers, at 191.  This precedent 
forced advocates to look to state courts for relief and relationship recognition, given the absence 
of protection under the U.S. Constitution
264
 Brennan Center, Press Release, June 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2002/pressrelease_2002_0525.html.
265
  Some judges are initially chosen in a contested elections and thereafter only stand for 
a yes or no retention vote.   Id.  Others are appointed to an initial term and then stand for 
retention.  Id.  Longer terms and the retention votes, give judges greater security than members of 
Congress or state legislators.  Notwithstanding this added security, the cost of judicial campaigns 
has increased significantly in recent years.  Id.  For example, candidates for state Supreme Court 
raised an estimated $45.6 million during 2000 campaign, which represented a 61 percent increase 
over the amount raised in 1998 and a 200 percent increase over that raised 1994. Id.
266
 Judges who must stand for election in progressive jurisdictions may be more likely to 
reflect the values of their constituents.  This need not be a question of ideology and judicial 
activism.  For example, judges who live in communities with a large visible population of gay 
men and lesbians may be more likely to apply the functional family definition that reflects the 
64
The responsiveness of the market to demands for relationship recognition stands in sharp 
contrast to the reluctance exhibited by the courts and legislatures.  For example, 8286 employers 
offer domestic partner benefits, including 244 of the Fortune 500 companies, 11 state 
governments, 130 cities and municipalities, and 295 colleges and universities.267  An even greater 
number of employers have included sexual orientation in their anti-discrimination policies.268
Indeed, domestic partnership policies are now so widespread in both the private and public 
sectors that LGBT lobbyists argue in favor of the Federal Domestic Partnership Bill on 
competition grounds, asserting that “[c]orporate America is leaving the federal government in its 
dust[.]”269
The market was the first mover with respect to formalized relationship recognition, and 
its innovation of domestic partnership benefits provides an excellent example of the dynamic 
process that can take place when institutions participate in the formation and articulation of 
contested social goals.270 Any institutional response to a demand, whether positive or negative, 
changing face of the American family.  See supra note 168 (discussing 2000 Census data).
267
 Human Rights Campaign, supra note 114.
268
 The first private employer to offer domestic partner benefits was the alternative 
weekly, THE VILLAGE VOICE.  ACLU, supra note 226.   Two years later, Berkeley became the 
first municipal employer to offer the benefits.  Despite its counterculture origins, domestic 
partner benefits have now been accepted as part of the corporate mainstream.
269
  HRC, HRC Urges Passage of the Federal Domestic Partnership Bill, July 14, 2005, 
available at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=The_Issues&CONTENTID=27901&TEMPLATE=/C
ontentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited July 31, 2005) (quoting HRC President Joe 
Solmonese).  According to the HRC, managers report that domestic partner benefits are a 
relatively inexpensive and very effective recruitment and retention tool.  Human Rights 
Campaign, supra note 225.
270
  It is important to keep the market-based domestic partnership status distinct from a 
relationship status granted through the political process that is designed to provide parallel 
benefits to marriage.  For example, in 2005 California extended to same-sex couples who register 
65
also helps to shape the next demand and refine the stated goal.  The market not only coined the 
term domestic partner, it participated in the construction of the concept that is now widely 
deployed both socially and politically to convey something much more that an eligible recipient 
of certain employee benefits.271
The concept of domestic partnership had very pragmatic roots.  When employers started 
to extend benefits to their employees’ same-sex partners in the 1980s, it was necessary to 
determine who qualified for these newly created benefits.  The definition, crafted in conjunction 
with LGBT advocacy groups, has influenced state and municipal relationship-recognition 
schemes, as well as court decisions attempting to define functional families.  Unlike a married 
employee, and employee with a same-sex partner could not rely on the bright-line status of state-
sanctioned marriage to telegraph the legitimacy of her relationship.272 Accordingly, employers 
developed a multi-part inquiry that attempted to disaggregate the hallmarks of a committed 
spousal-type relationship.  It required a statement of commitment,273 adherence to otherwise 
applicable marriage requirements, such as minimum age, prohibited degrees of consanguinity, 
as “domestic partners” many of the rights and responsibilities enjoyed by opposite married 
couples.  See supra note 256.  The potential for confusion arises because the market was the first 
mover in the area of recognition of same-sex partners and “domestic partnership” was a 
marketplace innovation.  In addition, municipalities were among some of the early employers to 
offer benefits for domestic partners.  
271
 A simple dictionary definition of the term “domestic partner” provides: “A person, 
other than a spouse, with whom one cohabits.” Houghton Mifflin Dictionary, Domestic Partner, 
available at http://www.answers.com/topic/domestic-partnership (last visited July 31, 2005).    
272
  Today, employers typically require employees to sign an affidavit, and, in many 
instances, submit supporting documents as proof of the relationship in order to prove their 
eligibility for domestic partner benefits.  HRC, Domestic Partner Definition, at 
http://www.hrc.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Work_Life/Get_Informed2/The_Issues/Domestic_
Partners_Definition/Domestic_Partners_Definition.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
273
  The statement of commitment is sometimes referred to as the “hearts and flowers” 
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exclusivity, and finally proof of financial interdependence.274
C.  Resilience.
The question of resilience attempts to measure the potential longevity of any gain by 
predicting an institution’s ability to withstand counter-demands. Often the counter-demands are 
made through intra-institutional channels and represent the common give and take associated 
with politics.  For example, the traditional values movement has waged consumer boycotts of 
firms granting domestic partnership benefits,275 threatened to impeach judges who are perceived 
to be pro-gay,276 and worked to frustrate the re-election attempts of legislators who supported 
relationship recognition.277  However, the real success of the traditional values movement has 
been its ability to harness the natural advantage enjoyed by the majority in the political process, 
particularly when paired with an unpopular minority.  The result has been a steady stream of 
prophylactic legislation in the form of state DOMAs designed to forestall relationship 
recognition and a series of counter demands designed to reverse gains already realized.278  The 
latter course often involves appealing to a wider demographic, such as subjecting a regional or 
clause ACLU, supra note 226.  
274
  Financial interdependence often can be shown by a variety of means, such as joint 
ownership of property and reciprocal beneficiary designations.  Id.
275
. See supra note 121 (discussing Southern Baptist Convention boycott of the Walt 
Disney Company).
276 See e.g., Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy is: Guilty, W ASH. POST, 
April 9, 2005, at A09 (reporting on meeting of conservatives where consensus was that Justice 
Kennedy, author of majority opinion in Lawrence, “should be impeached , or worse”).   
277
  For example, the Christian Coalition publishes a Congressional scorecard that rates 
the annual performance of members of Congress on a scale of 0 to 100.  Representative Barney 
Frank, an openly gay Congressman from Massachusetts, scored a 7 for 2004.  Christian 
Coalition, House Issues, available at http://www.cc.org/scored.pdf (last visited on Sept. 2, 2005).
278
  Many of the states enacted these so-called “mini-DOMAS” following Baehr v. Lewin. 
 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  See supra note 231 (discussing number of states with 
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local gain to a state-wide referendum.  It also involves using extra-institutional avenues, such as 
attempting to moot a court decision by legislation or a state-constitutional amendment.  
In the case of relationship recognition, the pattern of escalating counter-demands that 
expand the jurisdictional frame or appeal to another institution began after the 1993 decision of 
Baehr v. Lewin.279  Once the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the failure to grant marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples violated the Equal Rights amendment to the state constitution, it 
took another several years and numerous decisions for the court to conclude that the state had not 
established a compelling state interest that would to justify the denial.280 Before the case 
concluded, however, the voters mobilized, amended the state constitution through a referendum 
process, and mooted the decision.281  This trajectory was followed again in 1998 when an 
intermediate court in Alaska ruled in favor of same-sex marriage.282
Clearly, when assessing the potential responsiveness of a state court to a demand for 
anti-marriage legislation).
279
  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).  The traditional values movement, 
however, had successfully employed similar methods in connection with its attempt to stop the 
spread of anti-discrimination protection.  
280 Baehr v Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Cir. Ct. Haw. No. 91-1394, Dec. 3, 1996).  At the 
trial level, Judge Change made extensive findings of fact and concluded that the state, which had 
relied on a modified ‘best interests’ of the children argument, had failed to meet its burden.  Id.  
For an overview of this very complicated and protracted litigations see Human Rights Campaign, 
Same-Sex Marriage from Frontline to Footnote, available at 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=18157&TEMPLATE=/Conte
ntManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). 
281
  Baehr v. Miike, 1999 Haw LEXIS 391 (1999) (ruling constitutional amendment 
rendered lower court decision moot).  Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of the state of 
Hawaii now provides:  “The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.”  HRS CONST. ART. I  §23 (2005).  The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the amendment 
validated the sex-specific marriage law.  Id. See CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 126 (describing 
concerted effort by national organization to derail same-sex marriage in Hawaii).
282
  Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at 1 
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same-sex marriage, it is important to address any structural roadblocks which would include the 
prophylactic measures such as a state-wide DOMA.283 However, the lessons of Hawaii and 
Alaska illustrate that in order to measure resilience, it is essential to consider the state 
constitutional amendment process.284 By design, the next two state supreme court decisions
favorable to same-sex marriage occurred in jurisdictions with much more cumbersome 
amendment processes and the outcomes in both case were very different.285
In1999, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that same-sex couples were entitled to the 
same rights and privileges afforded to married couples.286  The decision specifically suspended 
the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples until the state legislature could attempt to 
remedy the situation.287  A year later, the legislature enacted the parallel status of Civil Unions 
which granted same-sex couples all of the rights of marriage in order to avoid the implementation 
of the 1999 court decision.288 Vermont does not have a state-wide referendum process and, 
therefore, the decision could not be overturned by resort to direct democracy.289  Only the state 
legislature can introduce a constitutional amendment and the process takes a period of several 
years.290
In 2003 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held in Goodridge that the state constitution 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
283 See Garrow, supra note 100 (describing evolution of marriage litigation strategy).
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
287 Id.
288 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2004).  
289
  Vermont does not have a statewide initiative process.  V.S.A. CONST. Ch. II, § 72 
(2004). 
290 Id.
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requires equal treatment of same-sex couples with respect to marriage.291  In an advisory opinion, 
the majority of the justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that proposed 
Vermont-style civil union legislation would not cure the constitutional infirmity, noting that the 
difference between civil unions and civil marriage “is more than semantic.”292 Although 
aggrieved voters mobilized around a state constitutional amendment, procedural constraints 
dictated that it could not be considered by the voters until 2006.293 Massachusetts began issuing 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2004.294 There are currently marriage cases pending in 
five states:  California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Washington.295
The prophylactic measures spawned by Baehr v. Lewin began as definitional statutes 
designed to clarify for the courts that marriage was by definition a union only between one man 
and one woman.296 This type of statute is reflected in the federal DOMA and the many state 
DOMAs that were passed immediately following Baehr.297  The scope of these measures has 
expanded over time.  Some constitutional amendments restricted the jurisdiction of the courts by 
291 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
limiting access to protections and benefits of civil marriage violates state constitution).
292
  Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E. 2d 565, 570 (2004).
293 See supra note 140 (describing constitutional amendment process).
294
  Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004. 
 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 
2004, at A16.
295
  LambdaLegal, Marriage Project, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/issues/record2?record=9 (last visited July 31, 2005).
296
  DOMA falls into this category.  See supra note 204 (describing DOMA).  It amended 
the U.S. Dictionary Act to provide that for all federal purposes “marriage” could only be between 
one man and one woman.  1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2004).  
297
  In its 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to be considered under the 
appropriate constitutional standard requiring the government to show a compelling state interest 
in denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).     
The trial was postponed for three years, and finally started in 1996 on the same day the U.S. 
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consigning the definition of marriage to the legislation.298  Measures aimed at restricting the 
powers of the courts reflect the traditional values movement’s growing hostility toward “activist” 
judges and the “Imperial Judiciary.”299  In 2004 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a 
court-stripping bill that purports to limit the power of the federal judiciary to decide the 
constitutionality of DOMA.300
As explained more fully in the following section, the traditional values movement has 
cast a wider net in attempts to address all forms of relationship recognition, not simply demands 
for equal marriage rights.  Recent state constitutional amendments prohibit same-sex marriage, as 
well as any grant of “the incidents of marriage.”301 States have also chosen to address individual 
Senate approved DOMA.  CHAUNCEY, supra note 96, at 125.
298
  For example, the amendment to the Hawaii constitution reserves for the legislature 
the power to define marriage.  HRS CONST. ART. I  §23 (2005).  Article I, Section 23 of the 
Constitution of the state of Hawaii provides:  “The legislature shall have the power to reserve 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”  Id.
299
  The traditional values movement has increasingly attacked judges who author pro-gay 
opinions.  For example, Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas, has been singled out for some particularly pointed criticism.  Milbank, supra note 276 
(reporting on meeting of conservatives where consensus was that Justice Kennedy “should be 
impeached, or worse”).  This treatment is part of a larger ideological objection to “activist” 
judges who are perceived to have overstepped their authority and usurped the legislative role.  
See supra note 195 (discussing “Justice Sunday”).  This hostility bubbled over during the Terri 
Schiavo controversy when U.S. House majority leader, Tom Delay warned, “The time will come 
for the men responsible for this to answer for their behavior.”  Carl Hulse and David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A1 
(reporting Rep. Delay “threatened retribution”).
300 Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004). See Alexander K. 
Hopper, Recent Development: Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Pledge Protection Act of 2004, 42 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 511 (2005) (discussing court-stripping and focusing on Pledge Protection 
Act).
301
  For example, the amendment to the Ohio Constitution adopted in 2004 specifically 
addresses attempts “to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”  OH. 
CONST. ART. XV, § 11 (2005).  This differs from the standard type of DOMA that was adopted 
by Mississippi in 2004.  MISS. CONST. ANN. ART. 14, § 263A (2005).  Section 263A of the 
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instances of relationship recognition. For example, Oklahoma recently enacted a law that refuses 
to recognize a second-parent adoption from a sister state.302 Virginia, on the other hand, chose to 
enacte a blanket statute that purports to void all private contracts “between persons of the same 
sex purporting to bestow the privileges of marriage.”303
This new generation of counter-measures has placed the continued resilience of 
marketplace gains in question.  The site of some of the most widespread gains in terms of 
relationship recognition, the market has proven to be largely impervious to intra-institutional 
counter-demands in the form of consumer and stakeholder pressure.304 Only a handful of 
Mississippi Constitution provides: “Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of 
this state only between a man and a woman. A marriage in another state or foreign jurisdiction 
between persons of the same gender, regardless of when the marriage took place, may not be 
recognized in this state and is void and unenforceable under the laws of this state.”  Id.
302 10 OKL. ST. § 7502-1.4 (2004).  The law provides that “this state, any of its agencies, 
or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the same 
sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.
303 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2005).  Titled “The Affirmation of Marriage Act,” its 
language could void not only domestic partnership benefits offered by private employer, but also 
private contractual arrangements between same-sex partners.  The full text of the statute 
provides:  
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the 
same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is 
prohibited. Any such civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement 
entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be 
void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be 
void and unenforceable.
Id.
304
  Despite their widespread use, the adoption of a domestic partnership policy can still 
provoke the protests of anti-gay consumers and other constituents, such as alumni and 
shareholders.  See supra note 121 (discussing Southern Baptist Convention boycott of Walt 
Disney Co.) (quoting Southern Baptist Convention “The boycott has communicated effectively 
our displeasure concerning products and policies that violate moral righteousness and traditional 
family values”).  
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employers have rescinded domestic partnership policies in the face of stakeholder complaints,305
and a much publicized boycott of the Walt Disney Company by the 16 million member Southern 
Baptist Convention ended in failure.306 State constitutional amendments that prohibit “incidents 
of marriage” could arguably void the grant of domestic partner benefits by public employers.307
Laws such as one adopted in Virginia could threaten even private employers.308
V.  THE FEDERAL MARRIAGE AMENDMENT: THE ULTIMATE MAJORITARIAN PREROGATIVE
As explained in the preceding section, the political process has been very responsive to 
counter-demands from the traditional values movement.  Initially, these efforts were designed to 
block or reverse “activist” courts committed to legalizing same-sex marriage.  The success of this 
program of institutional pre-emption illustrates  the potentially transitory nature of any court-
ordered minority gain, as favorable court decisions were ultimately reversed through the political 
process.  Courts may be designed to insure their institutional independence, but the exact 
305
  A notable exception to this general rule is the town of Eastchester, New York, where 
the decision to provide domestic partner benefits to city employees provoked a strong response 
from the traditional values movements.  Jennifer Medina, A Town in Westchester Ends Health 
Benefits for Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at B1.  The traditional values 
organization, Family First, filed a lawsuit against the city and then endorsed a candidate for the 
local city council who was opposed to the grant of benefits.  Id.  Eastchester rescinded its grant of 
benefits. Id.
306 Baptists End Disney Boycott, supra note 121.
307
  The Federal Marriage Amendment refers to the “legal incidents” of marriage.  The 
Federal Marriage Amendment, H. J. Res. 56 (2003).  The Oklahoma state constitution also refers 
to “legal incidents.” OKL. CONST. ART. II, § 35 (2004). The constitutions of Kentucky and 
Louisiana speak of “a legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage.”  KY. 
CONST. § 233A (2004); LA. CONST. ART. XII, § 15 (2005). North Dakota and Utah both state in 
their constitution that “no other domestic union” may be given “the same or substantially 
equivalent effect” as marriage.  N.D. CONST. ART. XI, § 28 (2005); UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 29 
(2005). Ohio forbids any “legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”  OH. CONST. ART. XV, § 
11 (2005).
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contours of their jurisdiction remain subject to constitutional revision through the political 
process.  The success also underscores the contingent nature of CIA because the analytic frame 
itself is subject to majoritarian revision.
In its latest efforts, the traditional values movement has attempted to break out of the 
“paper, scissors, rock” stalemate that is sometimes produced by strategic institutional choice.  
First, it extended its demand for prohibition to reach specific forms of relationship recognition 
short of marriage by drafting more aggressive DOMAs.309 Second, it continued with its tactic of 
appealing to ever larger and more diffuse electorates by moving the issue to the national stage
with its demand for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution.310  In this way, the traditional values 
movement’s most recent demands are comprehensive in terms of both subject matter and 
jurisdiction.
The new type of DOMA expands its reach well beyond same-sex marriage.  No longer 
content to prohibit only actual marriage, the new DOMAs have sprouted teeth, in that they 
purport to prohibit any grant of the “incidents of marriage” to same-sex couples.311 These newly 
aggressive state constitutional amendments target grants of parallel status by the legislature, such 
as civil unions and municipal registries, as well as the provision of domestic partner employee 
benefits by public employers.312 In addition, they could be interpreted to inhibit the ability of 
308 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2005).  
309 See supra note 307 (discussing different attempts to reach “incidents of marriage”).
310 See supra note 139 (describing current legislative status of FMA).
311 See supra note 307 (describing different ways states express concept of “incidents of 
marriage”).
312
  For example, the newly enacted marriage amendment to the Michigan state 
constitution provides: “To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for 
future generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only 
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courts to apply concepts of “functional” family or equity to secure certain rights and standing for 
same-sex partners.313
The traditional values movement gave this new generation of DOMA teeth because it 
correctly realized that instances of relationship recognition have potentially transformative value, 
even when the recognition falls well short of equal marriage rights.  For example, a court will 
often bolster its decision to recognize same-sex relationships by citing other examples of 
recognition, including the prevalence of domestic partnership registries and employee benefits.314
 These limited flashes of recognition have a cumulative effect on public perception and, as such, 
they further the long-term goal of the normalization of homosexuality.  
The Virginia law represents yet another innovation.  Whereas the new DOMAs apply to 
state recognition of same-sex relationships, the Virginia “Affirmation of Marriage Act” purports 
to void private contracts that attempt to secure the “privileges or obligation of marriage” for 
same-sex couples.315  This could include the grant of domestic partner employee benefits by a 
private employer and cohabitation agreements entered into by same-sex partners.316 Although 
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”  MCLS CONST. ART. I, § 
25 (2005).  After its adoption, the Michigan Attorney General issued an opinion stating that all 
governmental entities had to stop offering domestic partner benefits.  Rick Lyman, Gay Couples 
Files Suit After Michigan Denies Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2005, at A16.  The litigation is 
currently pending. 
313
  For example, a court in Ohio determined that the state’s marriage amendment 
mandated that a unmarried partner could not be charged with a domestic violence felony charge 
because it would approximate marriage.  Brian Albrecht, Issue 1 Conflicts with Domestic Abuse 
Law, Judge Says; Marriage Amendment Makes a Portion of Law Unconstitutional, He Rules, 
PLAIN DEALER (CLEV.),  March 25, 2005, at A1. 
314 See e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 196 Misc. 2d 440, 452 (N.Y. Misc. 2003) 
(noting that “Ford, General Motors, Chrysler and Coca-Cola” provide domestic partner benefits).
315 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2005).  
316
  Editorial, Uncivil Disunion, WASH. POST, May 9, 2004, at B06 (noting potentially 
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the attempt to reach private ordering may be Constitutionally infirm,317 it demonstrates the extent
to which the traditional values movement aims to erase any vestige of relationship recognition.318
No longer content to ignore non-state actors, it wants to reverse the gains made in the market 
that, up until now, have been remarkably resilient in the face stakeholder pressure.319
The FMA represents an endgame strategy to guarantee the durability of the scheme of 
state-wide DOMAs and impose the prohibitions on all states.  Days after the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Lawrence v. Texas and repealed Bowers v. Hardwick, influential Republican leaders and 
the President expressed their support for the FMA.320 In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia 
predicted a precipitous fall down a slippery slope that would end inexorably with same-sex 
marriage,321 and the traditional values movement took notice.322  To many in the traditional 
values movement, Lawrence signaled that the state DOMAs and the federal DOMA were now 
broad scope that could reach health care powers of attorney). 
317
  Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from interfering with 
obligations under existing contracts.  
318
  The Family Foundation, a traditional values organization in Virginia, includes the law 
under the heading “Victories for Our Families.”  Family Foundation, Victories for Our Families, 
at http://www.familyfoundation.org/victories.html (last visited on Sept. 2, 2005).  It notes that 
the law was necessary to insure that “counterfeit forms of marriage” did get receive any measure 
of legal recognition.  Id.
319 See supra note 275 (discussing failed boycott of Walt Disney Co.). 
320
  Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, expressed his unqualified support for the FMA three 
days after the Court decided Lawrence.  Frist Opposes Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2003, at B8.  The next day, President Bush addressed the issue of same-sex marriage during a 
Rose Garden news conference.  Neil A. Lewis, Bush Backs Bid to Block Gays From Marrying,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, A1.  
321
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting)  Justice Scalia 
warned that “judicial imposition of homosexual marriage . . . has recently occurred in Canada.”  
Id. at 604.  
322 See Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 2003, at 8 (noting that both sides “agree[] that the question of whether the United 
States will allow gays to marry would become the next major focus of both the gay rights 
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vulnerable to challenge under the U.S. Constitution.323  A federal amendment would forestall this 
potential challenge and have the added benefit of reversing all forms of state and local 
relationship recognition by putting a stop to regional experimentation.324 As currently drafted, 
the FMA prohibits same-sex marriage and the extension of the “incidents” of marriage to same-
sex couples.325
As discussed in Part III, the movement for relationship recognition is driven by 
individuals with very high stakes, whereas the interests of the traditional values movement are 
more diffuse.  The contested social goal of the recognition of same-sex relationships raises 
important issues of equality, autonomy, fundamental rights, morality, custom, and sincerely held 
movement and of social conservatives”).
323
  After Lawrence, some public opinion polls showed what was described as backlash, 
particularly with respect to views regarding same-sex marriage.  Joanna Grossman, Two States 
Offer Different Path to Same-Sex Marriage, CNN, Nov., 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/20/fl.grossman.samesex (last visited Sept. 2, 2005) 
(reporting that after Lawrence percentage in support of gay marriage dropping from 60 to 48).
324
  One of the most quoted statements on federalism and the ability of the states to 
implement a novel scheme is from Justice Brandeis’ dissent in the 1932 U.S. Supreme Court case 
New Ice Co. v. Leibman: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  New Ice Co. v. Leibman, 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (challenging state regulation of private industry).
325
  The Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) provides in full:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a union of a man and a woman. 
Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, 
shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be 
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
The Federal Marriage Amendment, H. J. Res. 56 (2003).  See Senator John Cornyn, Opening 
Statement, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Property Rights, Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov (last visited Sept. 29, 
2003) (stating “[r]ecent . . . cases . . . have raised serious questions regarding the future of the 
traditional definition of marriage, as embodied in DOMA”).  
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religious beliefs.326 In an attempt to mobilize broad support for the FMA, the traditional values 
movement has adopted the rhetoric of institutional choice and legitimacy.327 It characterizes the 
debate over the amendment as a question of who should have the power to define marriage: the 
unelected judiciary or the people?  In this way, the FMA is linked to the traditional values 
movement’s larger critique of the judiciary and its base discomfort with the principal of judicial 
review.328
This abstraction taps a fundamental question of CIA, namely “who decides.”329
However, it also glosses over the unabashedly anti-gay sentiments that typically animate the 
counter-demands of the traditional values movement.330  With the help of this abstraction, one 
can support the FMA without thinking that homosexuality is an immoral, unhealthy, and chosen 
lifestyle.331 One can also support the FMA without considering the effect it will have on 
326
  Justice Kennedy recognized that for some the question of the decriminalization of 
homosexual behavior raised “profound and deep conviction accepted as ethical and moral 
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.”  Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 571 (2003) (noting “for centuries there have been powerful voices to 
condemn homosexual conduct as immoral”).  
327 See e.g., Robert P. George, Judicial Activism and the Constitution: Solving a Growing 
Crises, available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS05D01&f=BC05F01 (last visited Sept. 2, 
2005) (discussing same-sex marriage case in context of legitimacy of judicial review).  See also 
supra note 195 (discussing Justice Sunday).
328
  See generally supra note 195 (discussing Justice Sunday).  On the topic of judicial 
review, an article on the FRC website begrudgingly acknowledges that the principle is 
Constitutionally defensible, but notes the negative reaction to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch)  137 (1803). George, supra note 327.
329
  Komesar notes that “Constitutional law raises the central issue of who decides who 
decides.”  KOMESAR, supra note 1, at 162.
330 See, Knauer, supra note 38, at 46-50 (describing traditional values construction of 
homosexuality).
331 Id..
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individuals in same-sex relationships and the families they have formed.332 The comfort 
provided by the abstraction is the reason that a social movement is necessarily larger than a 
platform of proposed legal reform.  
As with any movement for minority rights, the movement for relationship recognition
practices its strategic institutional choice against a potentially bleak majoritarian backdrop.  State 
constitutional amendments have blocked and reversed many court-ordered gains. The FMA has 
the potential to block many more.  The ultimate majoritarian prerogative to delimit institutional 
boundaries exists outside considerations of majoritarian influence or bias.333  It is the stark reality 
of majority rule.  Accordingly, at the end of the day, the path to minority recognition does not lie 
in deciphering the best institutional alternative or mounting a flawless litigation strategy.  It lies
with the atomistic forces that drive the institutions, with the neighbor across the street and the 
colleague down the hall.  
332
  According to the 2000 Census, same-sex couples live in 99.3 percent of all counties in 
the United States.  Human Rights Campaign, Gay and Lesbian Families in the United States: 
Same-Sex Unmarried Partner Households, available at 
http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/census.pdf  (last visited Sept. 2, 2005). 
In addition, according to the 2000 Census, 34 percent of female same-sex couples and 22 percent 
of male same-sex couples have at least one child under 18 living in the home.  National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force, Parenting, available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/theissues/issue.cfm?issueID=30 (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
333
  For an explanation of majoritarian influence and majoritarian bias see KOMESAR, 
supra note 1, at 67-70.
